

THEOLOGY

A Monthly Journal of Historic Christianity

Edited by the Rev. E. G. SELWYN, D.D., REDHILL RECTORY, HAVANT,
to whom all editorial matters should be addressed.

Vol. XVIII

FEBRUARY, 1929

No. 104

EDITORIAL

THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS—CANON LAW

EVIDENCE continues to accumulate from many quarters that the *New Commentary on Holy Scripture* has met a widely-felt need, and met it in a way which carries conviction. The welcome extended to it by the Press, secular no less than religious, and the fact that ten thousand copies had been sold within a week of publication, are a tribute to the extraordinary confidence which Bishop Gore inspires in the minds of the Christian public, and also to the credit enjoyed by Anglican scholarship generally in the field of biblical theology. Moreover, though the contributors are by no means limited to one school of thought, the plan and principles of the Commentary are essentially Catholic; and it is a significant fact that it owed its inception to the Literature Committee of the English Church Union, and especially to its Chairman, Dr. Harris. The graceful presentation made recently to Dr. Harris by the Council of the E.C.U. was symbolic at once of his own great services to Christian thought and learning, and of the steadfast backing which these have received from the Union itself. Nor should we forget the co-operation of the S.P.C.K., where Dr. Lowther Clarke's sympathy, scholarship, and shrewdness are always at command in such ventures as these.

Dr. Inge was quoted recently in *The Times* as having said of the Commentary that it registered the point where King Canute directed his chair to be put in 1929. We have not seen the context of the Dean's remark; but the implication would seem to be that he regards the Higher Criticism as a tide steadily advancing year by year up the shore of Christian belief, and that the Commentary can do no more than mark the point which its editor supposes it to have reached in the current year. The analogy, however, scarcely suits the Dean's argument; for

it is one of the characteristics of tides that they do not pass beyond a certain high-water mark. What if the Commentary has registered that mark? We do not mean that the work of Criticism is over; that cannot happen so long as the documents are there, challenging study in the light of every relevant advance in other fields of scientific or historical knowledge. But we do mean that the *principles* of Criticism have now been so thoroughly explored, tested, and applied to the scriptural records, and that too by Catholic theologians themselves, that it is possible to appraise the results in a more or less permanent form. Such appraisal we believe to be represented in this Commentary; and its effect is to reaffirm the authority of the Bible as the Word of God, and to show how secure are the foundations of the Catholic Faith.

Much interest has been aroused by the Report on religious instruction in Public Schools, which was approved by the Headmasters' Conference on December 22, 1928. The Report recommends that, for purposes of this instruction, the Public School boy's career should be divided into three stages. During the first of these, religious instruction should be mainly concerned with the Christian conception of God, and should be based upon the Gospels—studied “on broad lines of Christian belief and practice.” The Old Testament would be postponed to the second stage of the curriculum, attention being focused rather on the doctrinal teaching of the Prophets and the Psalms than on the historical record. The third stage would be devoted to the study of the growth of the early Church, as manifested in the Acts and the Epistles; and the edifice would be crowned by detailed study of selected books of the Bible and of the influence of Christianity in the world, not in the sense of Church history, but “as revealed in the lives of great Christians of every generation and in the missionary work of the Church.”

No one who knows from personal experience the problems which face a headmaster when he contemplates arranging a curriculum of religious instruction for his school is likely to criticize lightly any constructive proposals which may be made for its improvement. With the main aims of the Report, moreover, we are in substantial agreement: that a thorough knowledge of the Gospels should form the basis of the course, and that they should be taught with a view to drawing out the Christian conception of God, is obviously desirable. Nevertheless, there are passages in the Report itself, and also in the utterances of some of its supporters, which give ground for misgiving. Most serious, perhaps, is a point which is implied

rather than stated—namely, that it is apparently not considered possible to teach the Old and the New Testaments concurrently. If this is so, it means that the school's time-table has become so crowded that the times allotted to divinity have had to be curtailed. For the present writer does not remember any half during his own school-days twenty-five and thirty years ago when he was not learning both a book of the Old Testament—usually one of the historical books—and also a New Testament book, generally a Gospel, in Greek. There was also an additional period on Sunday which was devoted more often than not to some other biblical subject (such as the Prophets or Textual Criticism) or to Church history or to the story of the Prayer Book. The result was that a boy who was at all keen on his work left Eton in those days—and probably does so still—with an exceedingly good grounding in the things that a Christian ought to know. And we cannot doubt that this concurrent study of different elements of our religion is sounder in principle, and more likely to impart the truth in its proportion, than any plan which deals with only one element at a time.

Undoubtedly there were defects on the doctrinal side in the old system; and, in so far as the Report promises to remedy these, it is to be welcomed. But will it remedy them? There are two main bases of religious instruction, history and dogma; and on the whole English tradition has very decidedly preferred the first. It has preferred, that is to say, to draw doctrine out of history rather than to read history in a framework of doctrine. The choice has its dangers; but at least it has the advantage of being well adapted to the love of the concrete, which is so strong a feature of the minds both of masters and of boys. The Report appears to suggest the reversal of this method. A case in point is the precedence to be given to the Psalms and the Prophets over the historical books of the Old Testament. No doubt it is largely a question of emphasis; if what is meant is that the Old Testament narratives should be read in the light of the prophetic teachings which inspired them, well and good. But if it is meant that the prophetic writings themselves should form the staple of Old Testament instruction in the second stage, then we believe that there will be great loss: they are far harder than the historical books both for the master to teach and for the boy to understand.

A similar doubt as to what is intended must arise in the case of the Gospels: everything depends on whether by "the only Christian view of God" and "that which Christ held" is meant the rich theism of the Creeds or the starved and partial

version of it to be found, for instance, in Dr. Glover's *The Jesus of History*. Allusions made by supporters of the Report to the Cambridgeshire Syllabus of Religious Instruction as a model which Public Schools might follow are far from reassuring to those who know how much of that Syllabus is simply a summary of Dr. Glover's book. After all, the God of the Gospels is not simply the Father whom Jesus revealed in His life and teaching: He is also the Father who "spared not His own Son" and who raised Him from the dead for our justification. But too much must not be made of what may be no more than an individual attraction for Dr. Glover's book. Dr. Turner's magnificent work on St. Mark in the new Commentary becomes available at a very opportune moment; it is admirably adapted to form the groundwork for the teaching of the Gospels in Public Schools, and its adoption on a large scale for this purpose is not at all improbable.

There is one further point to be mentioned before we leave this Report. The provision made for the study of the influence of Christianity on the world is to be welcomed as a definite step in the right direction; but why is it so carefully laid down that it is not to be understood in the sense of Church history? A knowledge of the continuity of Church history—a feeling for "Christendom," in short—seems to us one of those things most needed for any education that is to be either liberal or Christian. Moreover, an admirable textbook—for masters, at least, and for older boys—exists in Lord Bryce's classical work, *The Holy Roman Empire*. We should like to see that book made the basis of teaching in the higher forms of every Public School. It would send boys on to the Universities, or out into the world, with a general outlook and perspective on Christianity and human affairs which would bear lasting fruit, and help them to realize how great is the stage on which they are to exercise their Christian calling.

The article by Dr. Coulton on "Roman Canon Law and the English Church" which we publish below has a direct bearing on a recent Report of a committee of the York Convocation; and the weighty authority with which Dr. Coulton speaks on medieval matters gives it particular importance. As between Maitland and Stubbs, we do not think that the issue is open to serious doubt. A pertinent question arises, however, in regard to the duration of the period within which Roman Canon Law held sway, especially in view of the article by Mr. Z. N. Brooke of which a *résumé* was given in our December issue by Mr. C. H.

Smyth. Thus, Dr. Coulton asks: "Did the *Ecclesia Anglicana* ever assert her independence from Rome at any time between the Conquest and the Reformation?" Perhaps not: it might often be wiser to assume it than to assert it; and for that matter, did she ever "assert" it before the Conquest? On the other hand, there was, it seems, in the twelfth century a real turning-point in the English acceptance of Roman authority. The "great concession," says Mr. Brooke, made by Henry II. in 1172 "altered the whole character of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in this country and necessitated the introduction of Canon Law practically in its entirety. Not merely is Canon Law now valid in England, but only now for the first time has it become completely valid. In its entirety it is a novelty; of its rules and procedure Englishmen were largely ignorant." This is a statement which should be borne in mind in reading Dr. Coulton's article, and has a direct bearing on our interpretation of the facts. Mr. Brooke contends that a real change took place in the twelfth century, and that, while Maitland is right as to the state of affairs after 1272, Stubbs is right for the earlier period. This means that Roman Canon Law, which was the instrument through which papal decretals became binding, was only fully accepted by the English Church for about two centuries and a half; and it is not unfair, as Mr. Smyth suggests, "to regard the Act of Supremacy of 1534 as the retort, belated but conclusive, to the Concordat of Avranches."

It is with deep regret that we read, as we go to press, of the death of Mgr. Batiffol. Mgr. Batiffol was a regular reader of this Journal, and occasionally contributed to its pages; and his deep learning and wide sympathies made him an invaluable interpreter between the Roman Church and our own. The present writer will never forget the warmth and kindness with which Mgr. Batiffol received him two years ago in his rooms near the Luxembourg, and the interest with which he discussed the revision of the English Liturgy. R.I.P.

SIN AND SALVATION: A STUDY IN WILLIAM LAW

I

THERE are probably few subjects in regard to which more difference of opinion and perplexity exists among the religious minds of our time than the problem of righteous anger and punishment. Thus in a recent book by one of the best known amongst Anglican preachers we read that "it is Christians and not Jesus who have made and still make God a punisher," and that by such an attribution of punishment and anger to God the Divine Fatherhood and love are obscured to the great detriment of true religion.* Again, a writer, whose ecclesiastical position is not far removed from the author whom we have just quoted, tells us that the view that "the Deity Himself never feels wrath and never punishes retributively," although "held by many Christians, is incompatible with Christianity," and he therefore justifies the employment of the criminal law as "the instrument of the outraged conscience of the nation."† And yet there is scarcely any problem upon which it is of more supreme importance that Christian leaders and, indeed, all possessing influence or authority should discover the truth. For the question of retributive punishment and the indignation of heart that inspires it profoundly affects the most essential departments of human activity; it must have a vital influence on the character of the education and training given to children and young people; it forms the central issue in the treatment by the state of lawbreakers and delinquents; it has practical importance in the struggle between capital and labour now so threatening to the stability of the nation; and it has an incalculable effect in international relationships both in the waging of war and the framing of peace. If, by much patient thought and discussion, and with an avoidance of bitterness, theologians and moral philosophers can arrive at an approach to a consensus on the fundamental question as to how far, if at all, God, as revealed by and in Jesus Christ, may be regarded as feeling wrath and exercising punishment, and if, as may be hoped, the agreed belief be an approximation to the truth, it is all but certain that in time that belief will make its influence effective in the various fields, educational and legal, industrial and

* H. R. L. Sheppard, *The Impatience of a Parson* (1927). See pp. 120, 132, 150-1, and 154.

† W. R. Inge, *Lay Thoughts of a Dean* (1926), p. 149.

international, in which the question of punishment arises. Moreover, the same question lies at the heart of any adequate understanding of the meaning of the atonement of Christ, which is the central doctrine of the New Testament.

Now, if there is any Christian writer who has a clear and sustained message to give us on these supremely difficult issues of wrath and punishment, of forgiveness and the consequences of sin, it is William Law, our greatest English prose mystic. Indeed, it may be said that this message of his is the central theme of his later writings, as it certainly is of his masterpiece, *The Spirit of Love*. The following study of his teachings is therefore offered as a contribution to the subject under discussion, and as an incentive to direct reference to the volumes of Law's works. It is, for reasons of space, very compressed and imperfect. William Law being, as F. D. Maurice once wrote, perhaps the most "continuous" writer in our language, the least unsatisfactory way of reproducing his thought in a small compass is by allowing him to speak at some length in his own words.

It was some six or seven years after William Law had written the *Serious Call* and become the best read religious writer of the period that he experienced a kind of second conversion on becoming acquainted with the works of the German mystic, Jacob Boehme or Behmen (1575-1624), and developed the beliefs which I have summarized below. They are to be found set out at length, and with a wealth of illustration, in the five volumes which Law published between the years 1736 and 1761.* The finest of these writings and the most important for our present purpose are *The Appeal*, *The Spirit of Prayer*, and *The Spirit of Love*. Boehme is ultimately responsible for most of Law's conceptions, but in a much less intelligible and otherwise less satisfactory form.

Of the numerous obstacles to a worthy appreciation of William Law's teachings the greatest today is perhaps that he starts, like all the theologians of his time, with the dogmas of the original perfection of man and his fall into a "natural" state of total depravity until he is "born again" from above. But the second of these dogmas is, in fact, modified in many

* The references in the footnotes to this article are to pages in the nine volumes of G. Moreton's 1893 reprint of the 1762 edition of Law's works. The following abbreviations are used:

App.—*An Appeal to all that Doubt the Truths of the Gospel.*

W.D.K.—*The Way of Divine Knowledge.*

S.o.L., I. and II.—*Spirit of Love, Parts I. and II.*

S.o.P., I. and II.—*Spirit of Prayer, Parts I. and II.*

Letter IV. and XII.—*Collection of Letters, IV. and XII.*

Trapp—*Answer to Dr. Trapp.*

War.—*Confutation of Dr. Warburton.*

places, often, indeed, unconsciously, by a generously inconsistent view of the divine origin of the natural virtues, and by Law's conception of the new birth as a very gradual process of development. And as regards the first, if we can agree that spiritual perfection and unbroken communion with God is the end and goal of human existence, it is not perhaps of great consequence whether or no we place such a condition at the beginning of human history. Law himself says in one place that the fall "is not an historical matter,"* but a fact of present experience.

A second difficulty in understanding Law is that his teaching is based on the very complex metaphysical theory of God and nature, regarded sometimes as three principles, sometimes as seven properties, which he derived from Boehme. And though for the sake of the uninitiated he tries with considerable success to avoid reference to this theory in a great part of his writings, yet every now and then he uses a term or an idea which is apt to be puzzling without some knowledge of this metaphysical background of his thought. We meet also at times with what may be described as a fringe of Behmenist mythology, relating especially to the fall of the angels and the life of Adam in Paradise. But these last eccentricities, while often very picturesquely set forth, are quite unessential to his system.

II

In order to understand William Law's teaching on the theme of human salvation, it is necessary to begin with his fundamental conceptions of the nature of God and man. That God is "all love" or, in other words, "an eternal, immutable will to all goodness" is, he himself tells us, his "capital doctrine."† "Love was the beginner of all the works of God, and from eternity to eternity nothing can come from God but a variety of wonders and works of love over all nature and creature."‡ The Almighty's purpose for all created beings was that they "might communicate the spirit of love and goodness, give and receive mutual delight and joy to and from one another."§

God is, moreover, a Trinity, in which power, symbolized by the restless energy of Fire, is conditioned by the Love (conceived also as Light) of which we have just spoken and brought into harmonious activity by what we call the Spirit. All the Love and Light of God is concentrated in and manifested by Christ. Man, created by God in His own image, was intended to remain a similar trinity of principles; and the

* W.D.K., p. 164.

† Letter XII., p. 191.

‡ S.o.L., II., p. 98.

§ S.o.L., I., p. 11.

essence of man is in his will, which being "a genuine birth of the eternal, free, omnipotent will of God," has "the nature of omnipotence"* in it, so that even God Himself is unable to guide or to save a man against his will.

But, alas, mankind have failed to keep the place intended for them. Through a form of self-will or self-love, conceived partly as pride and partly as sensuality, man has "broken off from the divine harmony"† and tried to find his centre in himself instead of in God. He has thus fatally separated himself from the divine Love and Light, and from the directing Holy Spirit. He has become a creature of "mere nature" divorced from God.

William Law could say, with amazing boldness for an eighteenth-century divine, that the whole Christian religion is built upon "the rock of nature" by "the God of all nature."‡ But this means nature kept in harmonious subordination to God. He adopted as the centre of his metaphysic the very profound but difficult speculation by which Boehme sought to solve the problem of evil, and conceived that at the heart of God Himself there was a potential centre of fiery darkness and restless desire, yet so covered up and blended, that it only normally issued as an energy of light and love. "If life in its first root was not this depth of strife, this strength of hunger and sensibility of want, the fulness of heavenly joy could not be manifested in it."§

But the spirit of self-will in the universe at large and in man in particular had uncovered and kindled this fiery fountain of evil, and nature, so far as left to itself, has become the scene of discord and disaster of every form. "All sin, death, damnation and hell is nothing else but this kingdom of self, or the various operations of self-love, self-esteem, and self-seeking, which separate the soul from God and end in eternal death and hell."|| For reasons which will shortly become apparent the most characteristic name which is given to this state of things is "wrath," identified with the wrath of God in Scripture. It is the wrath "of God," because nothing, however disordered, can exist apart from the sustaining power of God.

"Wherever Christ is not, there is the wrath of nature, or nature left to itself and its own tormenting strength of life, to feel nothing in itself but the vain, restless contrariety of its working properties. This is the one only origin of hell and every kind of curse and misery in the creature. It is nature without the Christ of God or the spirit of love ruling over it. . . . Everything, therefore, which is the vanity, the wrath, the torment and evil of man or any intelligent creature is solely the effect of

* *W.D.K.*, p. 211.

§ *S.o.L.*, I., p. 17.

† *Trapp*, p. 33.

|| *S.o.P.*, I., p. 38.

‡ *App.*, p. 82.

his will turned from God, and can come of nothing else. Misery and wickedness can have no other ground or root. . . . All the whole fallen creation, stand it never so long, must groan and travail in pain; this must be its purgatory, till every contrariety to the Divine will is entirely taken from every creature."*

This conception of human life and history brings us back to the doctrine of God as all Love. To William Law's mind the emotion of righteous anger and the will to punish retributively could not possibly have any place in the perfect moral ideal. Hence it follows that what is often called God's punishment of sin is nothing more than the unravelling or working out of the natural consequences of wrongdoing, the progressive degeneration of self-centred nature separated from God. Law was so convinced of these truths that he persuaded himself that he could explain the references to the wrath of God, not only in St. Paul's Epistles but throughout Scripture, in this objective and metaphorical sense of a state of the erring creature as conditioned by God's moral law. Some quotations will serve to make his position clear.

"It is a glorious and joyful truth (however suppressed in various systems of divinity) that from eternity to eternity no spark of wrath was or ever will be in the holy triune God. . . . He is in Himself, in His holy Trinity, nothing else but the boundless abyss of all that is good and sweet and amiable; and therefore stands in the utmost contrariety to everything that is not a blessing."†

"But to suppose that when the creature has abused its powers, lost its happiness, and plunged itself into a misery out of which it cannot deliver itself, to suppose that then there begins to be something in the holy Deity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost that is not of the nature and essence of God, and which was not there before—namely, a wrath and fury and vindictive vengeance, breaking out in storms of rage and resentment, because the poor creature has brought misery upon itself, is an impiety and absurdity that cannot be enough abhorred."‡

"For neither reason nor Scripture will allow us to bring wrath into God Himself, as a temper of His mind, who is only infinite, unalterable, overflowing Love, as unchangeable in love, as He is in power and goodness. The wrath that was awakened at the fall of man, that then seized upon him as its captive, was only a plague, or evil, or curse that sin had brought forth in nature and creature: it was only the beginning of hell. It was such a wrath as God Himself pitied man's lying under it; it was such a wrath as God Himself furnished man with a power of overcoming and extinguishing, and therefore it was not a wrath that was according to the mind, will, and liking, or wisdom of God; and therefore it was not a wrath that was in God Himself, or which was exercised by His sovereign wisdom over His disobedient creatures: it was not such a wrath, as when sovereign princes are angry at offenders, and will not cease from their resentment, until some political satisfaction or valuable amends be made to their

* *S.o.L.*, I., pp. 7-8.

† *S.o.P.*, I., p. 14.

‡ *S.o.L.*, II., p. 37.

slighted authority. No, no; it was such a wrath as God Himself hated, as He hates sin and hell, a wrath that the God of all nature and creature so willed to be removed and extinguished, that, seeing nothing less could do it, He sent His only begotten Son into the world, that all mankind might be saved and delivered from it."*

The woes so often pronounced on the wicked in the pages of the Bible are no more than "Divine awakening assurances given of that which must be the consequence"† of their continuing in the wrong way. Thus all the curse and the misery that followed the fall of Adam was "nothing of a penalty wrathfully inflicted by God, but was the natural state of Adam, as soon as his own lust had led him out of an heavenly paradise. . . . God brings no misery upon him, but only shows the misery that he had opened in himself, by not keeping to the state in which he was created."‡

As for the objection which superficial thinkers may bring against his doctrine, that it makes light of sin and conceives of God as easy-going benevolence, Law deals with it in the following impressive passage:

"This doctrine that allows of no wrath in the Divine mind, but places it all in the evil state of fallen nature and creature, has everything in it that can prove to man the dreadful nature of sin, and the absolute necessity of totally departing from it. It leaves no room for self-delusion, but puts an end to every false hope or vain seeking for relief in anything else but the total extinction of sin. And this it effectually does, by showing that damnation is no foreign, separate, or imposed state, that is brought in upon us or adjudged to us by the will of God, but is the inborn, natural, essential state of our own disordered nature, which is absolutely impossible in the nature of the thing to be anything else but our own hell, both here and hereafter, unless all sin be separated from us and righteousness be again made our natural state by a birth of itself in us. And all this, not because God will have it so by an arbitrary act of His sovereign will, but because He cannot change His own nature or make anything to be happy and blessed, but only that which has its proper righteousness and is of one will and spirit with Himself."§

III

The way is now clear to elucidate William Law's teaching on human salvation—on the cure of sin and the work of Christ. He disposes first very ably of the traditional penal substitution and satisfaction doctrines current in his day, both among Churchmen of the old school and in the Methodist movement for which his own *Serious Call* had laid so powerful a foundation. In illustration we may quote the following paragraphs:

* *App.*, p. 140.

† *S.o.P.*, II., p. 95.

‡ *War.*, p. 181.

§ *S.o.L.*, II., p. 81.

"The apostle says, 'God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son that all who believe in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life.' What becomes now of the philosophy of debtor and creditor, of a satisfaction made by Christ to a wrath in God? Is it not the grossest of all fictions, and in full contrariety to the plain written word of God? 'God so loved the world'; behold the degree of it! But when did He so love it? Why, before it was redeemed, before He sent or gave His only Son to be the Redeemer of it. Here you see that all wrath in God, antecedent to our redemption or the sacrifice of Christ for us, is utterly excluded: there is no possibility for the supposition of it; it is as absolutely denied as words can do it. And therefore the infinite love, mercy, and compassion of God towards fallen man is not purchased or procured for us by the death of Christ, but the incarnation and sufferings of Christ come from, and are given to us by the infinite, *antecedent* love of God for us, and are the gracious effects of His own love and goodness towards us."

* * * * *

"The innocent Christ did not suffer to quiet an angry Deity, but merely as co-operating, assisting, and uniting with that love of God, which desired our salvation. He did not suffer in our place or stead, but only on our account, which is a quite different matter. And to say that He suffered in our place or stead, is as absurd, as contrary to Scripture, as to say that He rose from the dead and ascended into heaven in our place and stead, that we might be excused from it. For His sufferings, death, resurrection, and ascension, are all of them equally on our account, for our sake, for our good and benefit, but none of them possible to be in our stead."

* * * * *

"Christ given for us, is neither more nor less than Christ given into us. And He is in no other sense our full, perfect, and sufficient atonement, than as His nature and spirit are born and formed in us, which so purge us from our sins, that we are thereby in Him and by Him dwelling in us become new creatures, having our conversation in heaven."*

There is only one possible sense in which the righteousness of God must have full satisfaction from man.

"What a paltry logic to say, God is Righteousness and Justice as well as Love, and therefore His love cannot help or forgive the sinner, till His justice or righteous wrath has satisfaction! . . . The compassionate love of God, that forgives sin, is no other, than God's love of His own righteousness, for the sake of which, and through the love of which, He makes man righteous again. This is the one righteousness of God, that is rigorous, that makes no abatement, that must be satisfied, must be fulfilled in every creature that is to have communion with Him. And this righteousness that is thus rigorous, is nothing else but the unalterable purity and perfection of the divine Love, which from eternity to eternity can love nothing but its own righteousness, can will nothing but its own goodness, and therefore can will nothing towards fallen man, but the return of his lost goodness, by a new birth of the divine life in him, which is the true forgiveness of sins."†

* *S.o.L.*, II., pp. 72, 85, and 74.

† *Letter IV.*, p. 144.

Again, in contrast to the traditional views, William Law insists that there is nothing supernatural in the method of human salvation, as revealed in the New Testament, but that it, and it alone, is required by the natural constitution of man. Starting from his fundamental premisses that man was made in the image of God, and that he lost the Light and the Spirit which were the essence of that image, he proves that there is only one possible way of recovery. "Hence we see the deep ground and absolute necessity of the Christian redemption by a birth from above of the Light and Spirit of God. . . . It is because all nature is in itself nothing but an hungry, wrathful fire of life, a tormenting darkness, unless the Light and Spirit of God kindle it into a Kingdom of Heaven."*

"The sum of all that has been said is this: All evil, be it what it will, all misery of every kind, is in its birth, working, and extent, nothing else but nature left to itself and under the divided workings of its own hunger, wrath, and contrariety; and therefore there is no possibility for the natural earthly man to escape eternal hunger, wrath, and contrariety, but solely in the way as the Gospel teaches, by denying and dying to self. On the other hand, all the goodness and perfection, all the happiness, glory, and joy, that any intelligent divine creature can be possessed of, is and can be from nothing else, but the invisible, uncreated light and spirit of God manifesting itself in the properties of the creaturely life, filling, blessing, and uniting them all in one love and joy of life. And thus again there is no possibility of man's attaining to any heavenly perfection and happiness, but only in the way of the Gospel, by the union of the divine and human nature, by man's being born again from above of the Word and Spirit of God. There is no possibility of any other way, because there is nothing that can possibly change the first properties of life into an heavenly state, but the presence and working power of the Deity united with and working in them. And therefore the Word was made flesh, and must of all necessity be made flesh, if man is to have a heavenly nature. Now, as all evil, sin, and misery have no beginning nor power of working but in the manifestation of nature in its divided, contrary properties: so it is certain that man has nothing to turn to, seek or aspire after, but the lost spirit of love. And therefore it is that God only can be his Redeemer, because God only is love; and love can be nowhere else, but in God and where God dwells and works."†

This position is closely akin to that of modern Christian psychology which teaches us that the crude animal impulses and energies, which are the necessary foundations of all human nature, must be sublimated by Divine grace into a passion for the love and service of God and man.

Regeneration, Law asserts, is usually not a sudden breaking through but a gradual process of growth. Moreover, the essential thing is not that the presence of a personal Christ should be

* *S.o.P.*, II., p. 65.

† *S.o.L.*, I., p. 22.

consciously recognized in the soul, but that the promptings of uprightness and love should be followed; accordingly, it is possible even for a heathen to experience the new birth. Thus in a long passage, wherein the necessity of humility is being emphasized as the basis of all true goodness, it is asserted that the hunger of the soul after the virtues of "patience, meekness, humility, and resignation to God" is "the one very same thing" as worshipping Jesus, the true Lamb of God. This "is truly coming to God through Christ; and when these tempers live and abide in you, as the spirit and aim of your life, then Christ is in you of a truth."*

The method of salvation is usually conceived under the familiar image of the new birth from above, pictured as a gradual opening from within the soul of the Spirit of Christ. The conception of new birth is linked up with two characteristically Quaker and mystical doctrines, that of the divine "seed" on the one hand, and that of the inner light on the other.

"Unless there had been a seed of life, or a smothered spark of heaven in the soul of man, which wanted to come to the birth, there had been no possibility for any dispensation of God to bring forth a birth of heaven in fallen man."†

The essential, therefore, for every man is to seek God within his own heart.

"Poor sinner! Consider the treasure thou hast within thee; the Saviour of the world, the eternal Word of God, lies hid in thee, as a spark of the Divine nature, which is to overcome sin and death and hell within thee, and generate the life of heaven again in thy soul. Turn to thy heart, and thy heart will find its Saviour, its God within itself. Thou seest, hearest, and feelest nothing of God, because thou seekest for Him abroad with thy outward eyes, thou seekest for Him in books, in controversies, in the Church and outward exercises, but there thou wilt not find Him, till thou hast first found Him in thy heart. Seek for Him in thy heart, and thou wilt never seek in vain, for there He dwells, there is the seat of His Light and holy Spirit."‡

IV

The intimate relationship between God immanent and God transcendent must always contain within itself an unresolved mystery, and William Law, like other mystics, was attacked (by John Wesley among others) for depreciating, if not ignoring, the historic revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, he is emphatic in his identification of Jesus of Nazareth with the inward Christ of experience, his favourite explanation of the mystery being drawn from the analogy of the outward sun,

* *S.o.L.*, II., p. 124.

† *S.o.L.*, II., p. 48.

‡ *S.o.P.*, I., p. 28.

which, by its penetrating power and warmth acting on the seed "hidden in the heart of the grain,"* promotes from within the growth of a young plant. So the work or "process" of Jesus, including in this term all His earthly life, teaching, death, resurrection, and ascension, is wholly directed to bring forth the new birth in man and to nourish the divine life, which is its product. "The birth, the life, the sufferings, the death, the resurrection and ascension of Christ are not merely remembered, but inwardly found and enjoyed as the real states of thy soul, which has followed Christ in the regeneration."†

When we enquire precisely as to the part played by the Jesus of history and why He had to pass through the extremes of suffering and death, we find that William Law's answer, like Jacob Boehme's before him, is almost exactly similar to that of Irenæus in his theory of *recapitulation*.‡ The whole doctrine of redemption, he tells us more than once, is comprehended in two short texts of Scripture (and the first of these texts he quotes repeatedly): "The Son of God was manifested that He might destroy the works of the devil," and "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."§ The special inference which Law draws from these truths is that "nothing but the incarnate life of God's eternal Son, passing through all the miserable states of lost man, could regenerate his first divine life in him."|| The following passages set this out more clearly:

"But here the amazing infinity of divine Love appeared, such a mystery of love as will be the universal song of praise to all eternity. Here God, the second person in the holy Trinity, took human nature upon Him, became a suffering, dying man, that there might be found a man, whose sufferings, blood, and death had power to extinguish the wrath and hell that sin had brought forth, and to be a fountain of the first heavenly life to the whole race of mankind."

"Now here is opened to us the true reason of the whole process of our Saviour's incarnation, passion, death, resurrection, and ascension into heaven: It was because fallen man was to go through all these stages as necessary parts of his return to God; and therefore, if man was to go out of his fallen state, there must be a son of this fallen man, who, as a head and fountain of the whole race, could do all this, could go back through all these gates, and so make it possible for all the individuals of human nature, as being born of Him, to inherit His conquering nature, and follow Him through all these passages to eternal life. And thus we see, in the strongest and clearest light, both why and how the holy Jesus is become our great Redeemer."¶

Man's redemption is effected by the "whole process" of Christ, by His earthly life and His resurrection, as much as by

* *S.o.P.*, I., p. 32.

† *S.o.P.*, I., p. 35.

‡ It is worthy of remark that the remains of William Law's Library at King's Cliffe, near Peterborough, still contain two editions of Irenæus' writings and also a *Life of the saint*.

§ *S.o.L.*, II., p. 75.

|| *Letter IV.*, p. 139.

¶ *App.*, pp. 142 and 144.

His passion and death. Nevertheless, it is right to pay especial honour "by way of eminence"* to the death of Jesus Christ on the cross. For the chief part of His agony, both in Gethsemane and on the cross, was due to His tasting for all men the bitterness of eternal separation from God, and to His faith coming victoriously through that overwhelming experience.

"As eternal death was as certainly brought forth in our souls as temporal death in our bodies, as this death was a state that belonged to fallen man, therefore our Lord was obliged to taste this dreadful death, to enter into the realities of it, that He might carry our nature victoriously through it. And as fallen man was to have entered into this eternal death at his giving up the ghost in this world, so the second Adam, as reversing all that the first had done, was to stand in this second death upon the cross, and died from it into that paradise out of which Adam the first died into this world."†

In the same book of the *Appeal*, from which we have just quoted, the doctrine is set out at length that Christ's blood had to be shed and His body slain, in order that men might receive into themselves the heavenly flesh and blood, as they may do pre-eminently in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. "Which sacrament," Law says, "was thus instituted, that the great service of the Church might continually show us, that the whole of our Redemption consisted in the receiving the birth, spirit, life, and nature of Jesus Christ into us, in being born of Him, and clothed with a heavenly flesh and blood from Him."‡ This emphasis upon the sacrament receded into the background in Law's subsequent works, in proportion as he tended to dwell more and more upon the constant practice of the presence of God, and less upon the institutional side of Christian worship.§

Moreover, it was needful for our complete redemption that Christ's death should be one of extremest torment and ignominy at the hands of men and the powers of evil.

"As Adam's trial was, whether he would keep himself in his paradisiacal state, above and free from all that was good and evil in this earthly world, so Christ's trial was, whether as a Son of man and loaded with the infirmities of fallen Adam, sacrificed to all that which the rage and malice of the world, hell, and devils could possibly do to Him, whether He in the midst of all these evils could live and die with His spirit as contrary to them, as much above them, as unhurt by them, as Adam should have lived in Paradise."

"Not an evil in flesh and blood, not a misery of life, not a chain of death, not a power of hell and darkness, but were all baffled, broken, and overcome by the process of a suffering and dying Christ. Well therefore may the cross of Christ be the glory of Christians."||

* *Letter IV.*, p. 138.

† *App.*, p. 145.

‡ *App.*, p. 153.

§ The evidence for this change is set out at length in the present writer's *William Law and Eighteenth Century Quakerism* (Allen and Unwin).

|| *S.o.L.*, II., pp. 96 and 90.

This conception of the Cross is not far off from the thought of it as the last and most effective weapon of non-resisting Love in the face of the implacable hostility of its foes, an idea which has become familiar to some of us today.

Jesus Christ is, throughout William Law's works, our supreme example of all forms of goodness, as He also is the indwelling seed of them all. But as a rule, when particular virtues are mentioned, it is as the great pattern of patience and resignation to the will of God, of separation from the spirit of this world, its pride, its love of dominance, pleasure, and wealth, that Jesus is set before us. Only occasionally is the Cross exhibited as the sole truly effective way of transforming the ill-will of sinners and recalling them to the bosom of God. But when this is done, as in the passage from one of his mystical dialogues with which we conclude this brief review, our author rises to such heights of fervour of language and purity of style that one recognizes at once that here are conceptions which come forth from the very centre of his being.

"Oh Humanus, Love is my bait; you must be caught by it: it will put its hook into your heart and force you to know that of all strong things nothing is so strong, so irresistible, as Divine Love. It brought forth all creation; it enkindles all the life of Heaven; it is the song of all the angels of God. It has redeemed all the world, it seeks for every sinner on earth; it embraces all the enemies of God; and from the beginning to the end of time the one work of Providence is the work of Love.

"Moses and the prophets, Christ and His Apostles, were all of them messengers of divine Love. They came to kindle a fire on earth and that fire was the Love that burns in Heaven. Ask what God is. His name is Love. He is the good, the perfection, the joy, the glory and blessing of every life. Ask what Christ is. He is the universal remedy of all evil broken forth in nature and creature. He is the destruction of misery, sin, darkness, death, and hell. He is the resurrection and life of all fallen nature. He is the unwearied compassion, the long-suffering pity, the never-ceasing mercifulness of God to every want and infirmity of human nature.

"He is the breaking forth of the heart, life and Spirit of God into all the dead race of Adam. He is the seeker, the finder, the restorer of all that was lost and dead to the life of God. He is the Love that, from Cain to the end of time, prays for all its murderers; the Love that willingly suffers and dies among thieves, that thieves may have a life with Him in paradise; the Love that visits publicans, harlots, and sinners, and wants and seeks to forgive, where most is to be forgiven."*

STEPHEN HOBHOUSE.

* *S.o.P.*, II., p. 108.

THE CHRISTIAN SACRAMENTS*

II

ON turning to Canon Quick's criticisms of what he calls my theory of the Real Presence, one is involved of necessity in a somewhat technical and arid discussion. The issues involved are not merely intellectual. What is ultimately at stake is whether we can reach closer agreement with traditional Catholic thought without sacrificing truths for which the Church of England is specially bound to contend, and whether we can allow, without allowing idolatry or materialism of thought, devotional practices which many persons find helpful. But because traditional Catholic thought, and these practices, are attacked on intellectual ground the issue must be faced on that ground; and, in view of all the centuries of discussion without much approach to agreement, and because it is probable that there is truth on both sides, it is also probable that the intellectual problem will prove complicated and difficult. Further, this problem raises the question of the nature of physical objects, of how we should think of these; and anyone who is familiar in any degree with modern philosophy (and more particularly with the work of Professor Whitehead, Mr. Bertrand Russell, and Mr. Johnson) will realize how much is thereby involved and how certain it is that any adequate conception of physical objects will necessarily be complicated. It remains the case that it is possible to worship without entering on these problems, but it is futile to face the question of whether or not such worship is ultimately justifiable without undertaking their examination.

I can best approach the discussion by stating briefly the view, which Canon Quick is concerned to criticize, before I attempt to deal with his criticisms; and this can, I think, best be done by an extract from Professor Taylor's and my paper, on the Real Presence, at the last Anglo-Catholic Congress.

The problem for philosophy is how far we are justified in thinking of a sacramental action or object in terms of its whole significance, in regarding it as something which is fundamentally spiritual, but has a certain physical expression, or whether we must treat the physical expression as peculiarly real, or at the least as something which must be carefully distinguished in thought. In life we do not so distinguish. A newly dubbed knight never thought of the accolade as a physical act with a certain symbolic

* The first of this series of articles on Canon Quick's book, *The Christian Sacraments*, appeared in January.

significance, but rather as an act of admission which had a certain ceremonial expression. In precisely the same manner Catholics think of baptism, not as a physical act with a certain symbolic significance, but as a spiritual act which has a ceremonial expression. Nor is the case different when we turn to objects which are "effectual signs." Take the commonest of such objects—a shilling or any other piece of token coinage. In this case emotions are not involved, yet, even here, who ordinarily distinguishes in thought between the physical properties of the object and those other opportunities of experience which it affords as being a coin of the realm? A physical object is a complex of opportunities of experience, including such experience as leads us to assign to the object shape, size, and position. We do not, in fact, separate in our thoughts those opportunities of experience which admit of analysis and correlation in terms of the motion of electrons, and others which do not; provided always that these further opportunities of experience possess a comparable certainty. We feel assured that a shilling will continue to have its purchasing price, and, being so assured, we think of the shilling as something round, hard, shiny, and with this purchasing power. Indeed, in our thought it is this last which is fundamental.

The question remains as to how far this way of regarding objects can be justified when we try to think precisely. Clearly the opportunities of physical experience have a more fundamental basis and are more certain than the purchasing power. The opportunities of physical experience are determined by natural laws, the purchasing power merely by Act of Parliament. The certainty of the latter is for ordinary purposes sufficient, but it is clearly less. Again, the association of the different physical properties is determined by natural law; the further association with these of a certain purchasing power is determined by Parliament. On grounds both of certainty and of the basis of association, we are bound to distinguish, if we think precisely, between the natural properties of the object and its properties as an effectual symbol.

But the matter is different if, or when, the effectual symbolism of an object is determined by the Divine Will, and has therefore the same basis as has its natural properties. . . . On any Eucharistic doctrine—whether Zwinglian or Catholic—the significance of the act of communion is drawn from a significance assigned antecedently to certain objects. If the symbolism is effectual, if we have no mere tokens but a sacrament, and it, in consequence, the consecrated bread and wine afford real spiritual opportunities, then these opportunities have the same basis as the opportunities of physical experience—namely, the Divine Will—and their further association with the opportunities of natural experience has also this same basis. There is no ground, either in regard to certainty of opportunity, or in regard to ultimacy of association, for treating the opportunities of physical experience as more fundamental. Nor is there any ground in the fact that the appropriation of the spiritual opportunities involves our co-operation. That is true also of the opportunity of physical nourishment, the only difference being that at the higher level of spiritual nourishment a higher and therefore conscious co-operation is required. Host, or Chalice, is a complex of opportunities of experience, some physical but some spiritual, all equally determined by the Divine Will and all associated by that Will. Accuracy of thought requires us to recognize, in consequence, that in each case these opportunities constitute a single object.

Canon Quick's first criticism on this view* turns on an objection to the conception of sacramental symbolism which is involved. He regards such analogies as the accolade or token money as profoundly unsatisfactory. "These symbols are almost wholly conventional and do not at all convey the reality which they signify." And he makes his own the following quotation from St. Thomas Aquinas:

Some, however, say that the sacraments are the cause of grace not by their own operation, but in so far as God causes grace in the soul when the sacraments are employed. And they give as an example a man who, on presenting a leaden coin, receives, by the King's command, a hundred pounds: not as though the leaden coin, by any operation of its own, caused him to be given that sum of money; this being the effect of the mere will of the King. Hence Bernard says in a sermon on the Lord's Supper: "Just as a canon is invested by means of a book, an abbot by means of a crozier, a bishop by means of a ring, so by the various sacraments various kinds of grace are conferred." But if we examine the question properly, we shall see that according to the above mode the sacraments are mere signs. For the leaden coin is nothing but a sign of the King's command that this man should receive money. In like manner the book is a sign of the conferring of a canonry. Hence, according to this opinion, the sacraments of the New Law would be mere signs of grace; whereas we have it on the authority of many saints that the sacraments of the New Law not only signify but also cause grace.

The reply which is required to Canon Quick's argument constitutes a general criticism of his view of symbolism. Canon Quick seems to me to depreciate and ignore altogether unduly "arbitrary" symbolism. I believe, however, that this criticism is less fundamental than appears at first sight, and that in so far as it is valid its results can be incorporated in his general view, although, of course, so as to involve some modification of this.

Canon Quick's comment (reinforced by his quotation from St. Thomas) turns on the point that the symbols do not *convey* that which they signify. Certain other points arise as to the quotation from St. Thomas, but here, too, this issue is fundamental. In the type of symbolism which, following the Articles, I described as effectual, do or do not the signs convey the thing symbolized? In what sense can they be said to cause grace? Now, in the first place it must, I think, be conceded that Canon Quick quite fairly calls this symbolism arbitrary. It is true

* I ought to make clear that Canon Quick's book was written before the publication of the paper from which the above extract is taken. The paper carried the discussion further into the field of philosophy than I should have had the ability or impertinence to attempt without Professor Taylor's collaboration and assistance. As a result, it meets by anticipation some of Canon Quick's minor criticisms (as I shall have occasion to point out), but in the main his criticisms are as relevant to the statement of the position in the Congress paper as to its earlier statement in "Essays Catholic and Critical" and elsewhere.

that the washing of baptism or the bread and wine of the Eucharist do serve to suggest the "inward part" of the sacrament, and as such they were clearly highly suitable "signs," and their choice had in consequence obvious advantages. But from the point of view in question others, which might have been less suitable, could have been chosen without altering the effectiveness of the rite as a means of grace, and even without altering its character as an example of effectual symbolism. What is ultimately involved in such symbolism is simply the attachment by a competent will to certain actions or objects of certain results or opportunities. The actions or objects can usefully be, but need not be, suggestive of the results or opportunities in question. On the other hand, all this is a question of the choice of signs rather than of the situation when they have been chosen. Others might have been chosen: in that sense the symbolism is arbitrary. But once certain signs have been chosen, once the sacrament has been instituted, it is no longer the case that something else will do. In consequence it does become a very real question as to whether the signs do not convey and even in some sense cause the grace involved. This may occur simply because they are, in fact, signs chosen by our Lord, but may none the less be the case.

It is well to note in the first place as against Canon Quick's tendency to depreciate arbitrary symbolism that the very arbitrariness of symbolism may have real significance and emotional value. It means much that we break bread and bless a cup because the Lord so chose. Or take even the more trivial piece of symbolism involved in the flower given by a woman. The choice is arbitrary, and just because it is arbitrary the flower has added significance as that which she chose. On the other hand, as Canon Quick is careful to insist, "a sacrament is on principle something more than a sign of any kind, more even than an effectual sign if we mean by that term something which can only be effectual as a sign or which is wholly dependent upon its significance for its effect. A sacrament is actually an instrument whereby God's power operates upon us not solely through the medium of a meaning apprehended by our minds." If (as I take to be the case) the meaning of the first of these sentences is explained in the second, I am in whole-hearted agreement. Indeed, I do not think the position could be stated more tersely or more truly. But, on the view I am concerned to defend, the phrase "effectual symbol (or sign)" is used in a sense which it is scarcely too much to say is the precise opposite of that which is condemned. I have already defined an effectual symbol as involving the attachment by a competent will to certain actions or objects of certain results or opportunities.

If we mean by the signs these actions or objects then it is clear that God's power operates on us not solely through the medium of their meaning. That is involved in what has already been said as to the arbitrary nature of the signs. Indeed, for the view which I am concerned to defend, the problem is rather that indicated in my earlier quotation from Canon Quick and in his quotation from Aquinas; namely, to show in what sense the signs can be said to convey grace and in what sense if any they can be said to cause grace.

In dealing with this problem, it is convenient to deal directly with St. Thomas's rather fuller statement of the objection. First as to the symbolism of action, the giving of a book or crozier. The issue is as to in what sense, if any, the action may be said to cause the result. In order to avoid questions as to the exact nature of the rites St. Thomas quotes from St. Bernard; I will take one with which I am immediately familiar—that by which the Master of a college admits a person to be a Fellow. He cannot admit in any way he likes. To admit, he must do and say certain specific things, and only if he does so is the admission valid and effective. The sensible action is not only a sign; it is the essential method, and its performance is an essential condition of admission. The rite in question is a method, and the sole method, in which a certain person is authorized to effect admission by the competent authority, which in the case in question is the authority of a statute of the realm.

The crucial fact is delegated authority. A person authorized to effect a certain result, which apart from specific authority he could not effect, is authorized to effect this result only in a particular known way which affords direct evidence of its exercise. It is because of this that the rite in question is not merely a sign of the exercise of the authority, but is the action, and the sole action, by which this can be exercised. It may therefore be said to convey or effect the result as being the means by which the result is brought about, and in ordinary circumstances the only means by which it can be brought about. I need not labour the parallel to baptism. It is, however, well to point out the consequence that if our Lord had baptized in person the rite would only have been a sign, whereas when we baptize, acting on His authority, the above considerations become applicable.*

When we turn to the Eucharistic symbolism, the position is simpler in some respects, more complicated in others. Here we are dealing with a symbolism of objects rather than a direct

* I am not for the moment concerned with the question as to whether our Lord gave the authority in His earthly ministry or mediately through the Church.

symbolism of action. The administration and reception draw their significance from a significance given antecedently to certain objects, although, of course, given to these as possible objects of reception and with a view to reception. This is implied by the rubric as to reconsecration, and indeed by the whole rationale of the rite. As has been said, this is the case on any view, whether Zwinglian or Catholic, but if the symbolism is effectual, if the rite instituted by our Lord mediates grace,* it follows that the bread and wine, after consecration, afford certain spiritual opportunities. It is through the devout reception of the consecrated bread and wine that we are made partakers in the blessings of Christ's sacrifice and in His life; and the destruction of the consecrated elements in any manner involves in consequence the destruction of specific spiritual opportunities. If this be so, then it is difficult to deny that the physical objects are no *mere* signs, but convey the spiritual opportunities which are in question and in this sense effect grace. This appears to hold true apart from any particular conception of objects, but the matter may be put even more strongly if, as the view at issue maintains, accuracy of thought requires us to regard the bread and wine as changed at consecration, in that the complex of opportunities of sensible experience which constitutes the bread or the wine is changed "in and through the inclusion of opportunities of spiritual experience no less ultimate and associated no less ultimately than the pre-existing opportunities of physical experience." It follows that the signs (*i.e.*, the persisting opportunities of sensible experience) are an essential element in an object which certainly conveys and causes grace, and in this sense the signs themselves must be regarded as conveying and effecting grace.

St. Thomas's analysis is, in fact, inadequate. In the first place, he implies that the "King's command" is separable from the "lead coin" in a manner which is not the case with a true token coinage. No amount of proof of past and legitimate possession will entitle a man to receive gold from the Mint in virtue of ten florins if these have been melted by fire. The physical object "conveys" the right to gold. In the second place, St. Thomas's economics appear to be inadequate. His

* Apart altogether from any question of later tradition or of religious experience, the natural meaning of the words of institution for persons familiar with sacrificial conceptions was surely "consuming these you are made partakers in a sacrifice in which I am the victim." Further, these conceptions undeniably involved the further belief that *if a sacrifice should be thought of as effecting real spiritual results*, ritual participation in a right spirit secured (and normally conditioned) participation in the blessings of the sacrifice. It is not possible to suppose that our Lord meant something different by the words of institution—and that the Scriptures meant something different—than the natural meaning of these words in His age, and therefore in an age familiar with sacrificial conceptions and when the Paschal background inevitably suggested interpretation in the light of these conceptions.

statement regards a token coin as in itself at most conveying simply a right to gold and fails to take into account the fact that it thus becomes "money," that, for example, the number of such coins in existence will in ordinary circumstances affect prices. Finally, St. Thomas's whole argument is, of course, vitally affected if a physical object is properly regarded as "a complex of opportunities of experience, including such experience as leads us to ascribe to the object shape, size, and position." If that view is correct, then the inclusion of further opportunities of experience, no less ultimate and no less ultimately associated, involves, as has been said, a change in the object.

With Canon Quick's criticism of this view of objects I shall be concerned in a concluding article. He makes, however, certain further criticisms as to the conception of symbolism involved, and these require notice. In the first place, Canon Quick argues that there is a difference between the case of a coin and of the Eucharistic bread or wine in that the coin must have a certain shape, etc., and, so far as I understand him, he holds that whenever an object becomes in itself an effectual symbol some physical change must be involved. That appears to me incorrect. A piece of silver of a particular form becomes a coin not in virtue of this form, but by being issued by the Mint. Another piece of metal of identical composition and shape, but not so issued, is not a coin: that is to say, does not convey a "right to gold," and is not money. The authorities of the Mint may only be empowered to make into coins of the realm, by issuing them as such, pieces of silver of a particular shape, just as the Church can only consecrate certain forms of matter to be our Lord's sacramental Body and Blood;* but in each case this is a limitation of what may be made "effectual symbols" by persons acting with delegated authority, and does not affect the fact that certain objects become effectual symbols in and through acts which do not involve or depend upon a change in their appearance.

The further point which I wish to notice turns also on the view that change in appearance must be involved in an object becoming a symbol. Canon Quick holds that within the Eucharist the "new symbolic value of the consecrated elements consists in what is being done with them, just as their new instrumental value consists in what is being done through them." There being no change in their appearance, he holds (as I understand him) that they cannot be symbols in themselves; but are only symbols when something visible is being done with them, which something supplies a special "appear-

* For a discussion of the use of this phrase see Professor Taylor's and my paper, *Anglo-Catholic Congress*, 1927.

ance " necessary for symbolism. Canon Quick goes on to argue that this condition is satisfied in the Eucharistic action (or in communion with the reserved sacrament), but not when the sacrament is being reserved; and he condemns in consequence extra-liturgical devotions. Now I am inclined to think a valid answer is afforded, even on Canon Quick's own view, by saying that when the Sacrament is reserved something is done with it, namely, it is being reserved to be given in communion; and something is done through it, namely, the immediate possibility of sacramental communion is thereby secured. But in any case, as I have said, the objection turns on the view that change in appearance is involved in any symbolism. On my view Canon Quick is involved in having to maintain that a shilling is not a coin when in a money-box. On his present basis he is, of course, saved from any such paradox by his conception of the part played by the shape of the shilling. But if the shape of the shilling does not make it a coin of the realm, if this is determined by its being issued by the Mint, or apart from the provisions of the relevant existing statutes if it is theoretically the case that a token coinage could be established in which *by issue* certain natural objects (say cowries) were made coins of the realm, then the paradox does arise and, so far as I can see, cannot be answered satisfactorily.

I cannot but believe that the weak spot—I am tempted to say the only weak spot—in Canon Quick's discussion of symbolism is the importance he thus attaches to change of appearance, exalting this, from an obvious convenience in many cases, into an essential condition. I believe that, however badly I at least and possibly others may have expressed our conception of "effectual symbolism," this contains far more truth than Canon Quick has recognized in his book: and I believe that if he can see his way to allow for this conception, and its considerable relevance in certain cases of symbolism, which include the Sacraments, his whole treatment of the subject will gain in completeness and force. Nor do I suppose that he would in any degree be unwilling to accept such a change of view because it affords a justification for certain devotional practices which are valued by many Roman Catholics and by some Anglicans.

WILL SPENS.

(To be concluded.)

THE NATURE OF CATHOLIC AUTHORITY

CHRISTIANITY is normally, and perhaps necessarily, presented to the world by theologians as a dogmatic system, proceeding from the nature of God and man to the person of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit and so to the doctrine of the Sacraments and the Church. It is, perhaps, necessary that this order should be adopted, since a system of theology must present itself as an intellectual whole. But it is quite certain that Christianity did not develop itself in this way as a matter of history. In the New Testament we find not the record of a divine revelation of a system of dogma, but the reaction of the first disciples to their belief that the Master whom they had loved and followed had risen from the dead. It is only in the Pauline and Johannine writings that we find an attempt at anything like a philosophy of Christianity; it is true that their interpretation of the meaning of Christianity has coloured to some extent the Synoptic narratives of the human life of Christ, but the colouring is very slight, and does not obscure the fact that to His first followers Jesus was rather an enigma than a dogmatic revelation.

It would, indeed, be very difficult to point out any definite element of dogma in the beliefs of the first disciples, except this, that Jesus had risen from the dead and was thereby shown to be the Messiah, who was shortly to return in glory. This was added to the existing beliefs of Judaism, without any very clear attempt to harmonize the old and the new. But Christianity contained a quite new element of practice in the form of the Eucharist and the emphasis on the power of the Spirit as manifested in the worship of the Church. Judaism could have tolerated, and in fact did for some time tolerate, the belief of Christians in the Messianic claims of Jesus. But the new elements of worship inevitably resulted in an attitude towards the person of Jesus which could not be harmonized with the belief and practice of the synagogue. The new elements in Christian worship were bound either to die out as aimless and unnecessary eccentricities or to lead to a revision of the Jewish conception of the nature of God and His relations with man which must necessarily prove fatal to the religion of the synagogue. The Pauline and Johannine writings record a development in the Christian conception of the person of Jesus and His relation to God which originated in the fact that He was felt to be the centre of Christian worship and devotion. They are attempts to explain and justify a position which He already holds, not attempts to lay dogmatic foundations for the future

development of a system of cult. It was just possible for Judaism to tolerate the new cult, as long as it remained unrationalized; but it could only be rationalized by a theology which Judaism was bound to reject.

As a matter of history it is generally true that attempts to develop the dogmatic system of Christianity have succeeded or failed not in virtue of their purely intellectual merits, but in virtue of their compatibility or incompatibility with the religious life and experience of the general body of Christians. It is very difficult to resist the conclusion that Valentinus was from the point of view of pure intellect the superior of Irenæus, and however eccentric his speculations may seem to us they were in harmony with the intellectual atmosphere of his time. The victory of the common sense of orthodoxy was not a victory for pure intellect, but a victory for Christian devotion as hitherto known over an attempt to substitute a metaphysical system for the person of Jesus. The same phenomenon may be seen in the other great controversies of the Church. In the last resort it is the effect of some new definition of belief on the existing structure of Christian life and devotion that has determined its fate. The exceptions to this general rule are the controversies which deal with purely intellectual questions which could have been decided in either way without affecting in the least the life of the ordinary Christian or the controversies which are concerned with an entirely minor and unimportant point of practice. It is precisely these controversies which the student of ecclesiastical history finds both dull and tragic—dull because no interest attaches to the result, tragic because they are such a futile waste of the energy and learning of the Church. It must, of course, be recognized that in certain cases controversies over apparently futile points were really concerned with a larger issue. It is hard to attach any importance to the controversy as to the *Filioque* clause; but in so far as the controversy became a test question in the controversy as to the mutual relations of Eastern and Western Christendom, it did concern a point of some genuine interest and importance.

Thus historically Christianity begins with a personal revelation and a system of worship; it is only out of the necessity of explaining these that it develops a dogmatic system. It is true that it inherited to some extent the dogmatic system which had been developed by the Jewish nation; but here too it was from a system of cult and from the personal religious experience of the great figures of the Old Testament that the dogmatic system of Judaism was developed. If the matter could be traced back to its origins it is probable that the primitive savage's sense of awe and his attempts to propitiate some dimly

felt cause of that sense precede any clear formulation of an intellectual belief in God: the fact that Christianity appears in the middle of a long process of doctrinal evolution, and accepts a great deal of what has been already formulated, does not in any way contradict the view that experience precedes dogmatic formulation.

It is very difficult to hold that Christianity can claim any objective validity as a system of religion unless it be conceded that in some sense it has in the person of Jesus a definite revelation of God to man. The historical creeds are the attempt of Catholic theology to formulate what is implied in this belief and in the consciousness of communion with God which those who accepted that belief have experienced. They are, in fact, the logical conclusion of that process of rationalization which is at work in the Pauline and Johannine writings, reduced for purposes of convenience to a popular form and summarized as briefly as possible. But the experience of communion with God through the person of Jesus was anterior to those writings and to the Creeds which arose as the result of the process. Thus the ultimate authority both of the Apostolic writings and of the Creeds is something anterior to them—namely, the belief of the Christian Church that in the person of Jesus it has a revelation of God to man, and the fact that by adopting a certain attitude of the soul towards the person of Jesus as the revelation of God the believer is, in fact, able to attain to the state of communion with God and the power to grow in grace which that belief and that attitude of soul profess to be able to give. It is, of course, open to the unbeliever to deny the validity of the belief or the value of the results achieved by it. But if the preliminary claim that the person of Jesus is in some true sense a revelation of God to man be once admitted, the claim of Catholicism as a living and growing tradition of faith and practice depends not in the last resort on the intellectual finality of the Creeds, but in its power to produce in the believer those results which may be described in the language of religion as the union of the soul with God through Christ, and which in the sphere of conduct are manifested in the Christ-like character, or "the fruits of the Spirit." For it must be remembered that the process by which Catholicism as a system of religion has been formed is a continuous one, in which faith and practice react on one another. The formulation of a doctrine begins as the attempt to rationalize what is already implied in existing practice. The test of its adequacy as a formulation is the extent to which it commends itself to Christian thought in general. But its general acceptance, whether by tacit consent or by a formal promulgation by an authority claiming to speak

in the name of the whole Christian body, does not leave things where they were. The new light which it throws on the relations of God to man will enable the faithful to have a clearer understanding of what was already implied, and in virtue of that clearer understanding their devotion will become a more intelligent, and therefore a deeper and worthier one.

The point may be illustrated by an example which has the merit of not being concerned with the controversies of the moment. It has always been held by Christian devotion that intercessory prayer is of direct value as a means of obtaining from God those benefits which we desire in so far as they are in accordance with the will of God for us. Yet the conception involves enormous difficulties. It implies that God will grant, if we ask for them, things which He would or might otherwise withhold. It implies that in some sense the divine ordering of the universe is subject to the will of man. For instance, if I pray for the recovery of a friend who is dangerously ill, my action implies that it depends to some extent on my prayers whether he will live or die. Yet it is very difficult to see how, if God wishes him to live, He can leave the issue to depend on me, or if He wishes him to die, he can relieve him at my request. Yet, if my prayers have no influence on the issue, it seems to be entirely indifferent whether I pray or not, except in so far as my prayers may have a beneficial result on my own spiritual life, similar to the benefit which might be produced more effectively by meditation.

The problem is one of which many solutions have been offered, none of which is very satisfactory. One solution is that already suggested, that my prayers benefit me spiritually by increasing my sense of dependence upon God, but in no other way. Any one who believes himself to have received an answer to his prayers in some important matter will reject the explanation as totally inadequate. Another explanation is that if I pray and my prayers are answered, it is because both my prayer and the answer to it were ordained by God as part of the universal order of things from the beginning; and equally if I fail to pray and I fail to obtain my object, my failure was so ordained. This explanation is entirely untrue to my consciousness that it is here and now within my power to decide whether I will pray or not. Another explanation is that such answers to prayer are genuinely possible on the ground that within the purely spiritual sphere God reserves to Himself the right, so to speak, to act by the transmission through Himself of the ideas of one spiritual being to another. Thus in our instance, if I pray my prayer will by a kind of telepathy be transmitted from me through God to the mind, for example, of the doctor

or nurse in charge of the case, who will be inspired to choose a method of treatment which otherwise would not have been thought of. The explanation has its merits, but seems to involve an arbitrary delimitation between the spiritual and material spheres which is not altogether easy, and further to limit the power of God in a very difficult way. It is, perhaps, impossible to do more than to say that the efficacy of prayer is a fact of religious experience, of which we are immediately conscious, and a datum of the religious knowledge of man. Although it may be very hard to reconcile it with that conception of God and the universe which is implied in our metaphysical conception of God and our scientific knowledge of the universe, that does not prove that it is invalid, for the simple reason that the knowledge of God and the universe which we derive from these different sources may always be difficult to reconcile, and in some cases the reconciliation may be beyond the scope of the human mind. This does not mean that man may not seek to find the reconciliation, but merely that if at any given moment he has failed to find it, he must be content to hold together in his daily life both sides of the apparent contradiction. Yet if at any time an adequate solution could be found, it would be an immense assistance to the efficacy of the prayers of the faithful, many of whom find it hard to pray, just because of their acute consciousness of the intellectual difficulties involved.

It may be remarked that a similar difficulty may be found in many other doctrines of Christian theology; indeed, it may fairly be said that the two central doctrines of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation are instances in point. In the former case, we have to combine belief in the threefold nature of God as seen in the Christian revelation with the unity of God which is a postulate of any sane theology; in the latter we accept the union in the person of Jesus of the apparently incompatible natures of God and man. The Christian faith in doing so claims that the truth is one which transcends the scope of the human intellect. Yet at the same time the conceptions which transcend the scope of the intellect have proved capable of satisfying the devotional needs of mankind in a way that proves that they have at least a greater degree of validity than the various simplifications of them that have been put forward at different times. This does not necessarily prove that any attempt to find a more adequate theological expression of the truth they contain must necessarily fail; it does prove that any theological expression, which is on the purely intellectual side more satisfactory, is foredoomed to failure if it does not also preserve that devotional value which the traditional formulæ possess.

Nor is this claim an unreasonable one. The nature of God

is not simply to be apprehended by the pure reason. It is known experimentally in that attitude of the soul to God which is usually described as faith. From the point of view of the ordinary Christian any conception of the person of Jesus which regards Him as less than God or not completely human is inadequate to express that attitude of the soul to His person which is the foundation of Christianity. It might, indeed, be argued that the ordinary man's faith is in respect of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity often hardly to be distinguished from tritheism, for the simple reason that the insistence of Christianity on the unity of God is to a certain extent due to the necessity of reconciling devotional experience with metaphysical truth. This necessity has always been recognized by traditional theology; but it is to be remembered that on the higher planes of Christian experience we also find a consciousness of the unity of God which transcends any tendency to tritheism which may be found in the lower stages. The great mystic writers seem to attain to a consciousness of God as one, whereas to the beginner He appears in experience as three persons, His unity being accepted more on the basis of authority and intellectual necessity than on the immediate facts of the spiritual life.

Thus these dogmatic formulæ can only be appreciated in their true light if they are seen to be not pure statements of intellectual truth but "rationalizations" or attempts to express in intellectual language truths which are drawn from the sphere of experience. As such they are of value in so far as they adequately express that experience; a formula which seems more adequate intellectually stands condemned if it fails to preserve those values for which it professes to account. The same test can be applied to any scientific theory; if it fails to account for the phenomena which it professes to explain, it is manifestly untenable. This does not imply that the formulæ which appear to account for the facts are necessarily to be regarded as sacrosanct. They may be inadequate "rationalizations," and if so they stand in need of alteration; but no alteration can be regarded as satisfactory which fails to account for the facts of experience, which are anterior to and independent of the "rationalization" of them.

There are two main tests by which the adequacy of any such "rationalization" can be tested. The first is the extent to which it has proved adequate as an explanation of the facts and as a means of enabling those who accept it to advance in that life of union with God as revealed in the person of Jesus which Christianity professes to provide. The extent depends, of course, not on mere numbers, but to some extent on the quality of those who accept it and their capacity to judge of the truth.

For instance, the purely superstitious cult of a local saint may help a large number of simple believers but offend, for example, the historian who knows that the Saint never existed. In fact, there may be in the whole cult no more truth than the fact that the real or supposed life of the saint was a striking manifestation of the Christlike character. In such cases it is certainly the duty of theology to deliver religion from the element of superstition, for a false rationalization, even if at the moment helpful to some people, will in the long run prove disastrous. This brings us to the second test, which is the general compatibility of the rationalization with the general sum of human knowledge. In the case supposed, it can hardly be denied that certain cults of the more superstitious types definitely imply a conception of God which is lower than any which can be tolerated by a reasonable conception of the world, even if they are not immediately felt to involve a lower conception than is involved in any genuine experience of Christian devotion.

Thus the ultimate authority of Catholicism is that it is a living and growing tradition of Christian life and practice, which has in its actual results enabled countless thousands of believers to produce in their lives that Christlike character which the Christian faith professes to enable man to realize. The authority of Catholicism as a dogmatic system is that it represents that attempt to explain in the language of philosophy the nature of God and His relations to man which has been found in practice to be the most adequate rationalization of that system of life and practice. By the phrase "the most adequate explanation" must be understood not merely that it seems the most satisfactory in pure theory, but also that in its development it has proved capable of giving to those who accept it a more intelligent faith and a deeper personal devotion. The fact that in its development it has been felt to explain satisfactorily the facts of the Christian experience of communion with God and has proved capable of enhancing that experience as it advances is the guarantee that it is on the whole a true account of the matter. At the same time this does not prove its absolute finality; it is always conceivable that there might be some other explanation. Only such an explanation must preserve all those values of the Christian devotional life which are known facts of experience, and it must explain them without explaining them away. Further, it is entirely beside the point to dispute some point in the general dogmatic system of Catholicism under the impression that the disproving of the dogma will lead to the abandonment of the practice which it professes to explain. An instance of this may be found in Eucharistic controversy. No amount of argument against the doctrine of Transubstan-

tiation has any real value as an argument against the attitude of the believer towards the Blessed Sacrament, of which the dogma of Transubstantiation is a rationalization. The believer who is conscious of communion with Our Lord under the outward forms of bread and wine is conscious of a fact anterior to and independent of the doctrine. An attempt to deny the fact by proving the dogma to be false will leave him cold. It is, of course, entirely tenable that the dogma is not the best possible explanation, and to attempt to replace it by some better statement of what is implied in the truths of Christian experience; but no explanation which fails to preserve those values has a real claim to be considered seriously.

Thus the ultimate argument for Catholicism is not really something which can be couched in the terms "This is the Catholic faith; take it or leave it," but rather in the terms "Taste and see that the Lord is gracious." On the other hand, it is only natural and reasonable that the enquirer attracted to it as a system of devotion should accept at least in its main outlines that explanation of the truth which has been found to be both in theory and in practice the best explanation of those relations between God and man which are implied in the Catholic life of devotion. At the same time, it is, perhaps, desirable that it should be more clearly recognized than is normally the case that the truths of religion may represent one aspect of the truth, and that it may not always be possible to reconcile them completely at any given moment with the truths of science and metaphysics. It is not, of course, tolerable to expect the believer to swallow something which contradicts such knowledge; it is not unreasonable to suppose that the aspects of truth as seen by different sides of man's nature may be at some particular moment in the development of human thought and religion difficult to harmonize in their completeness. This may be evidence that the rationalization of the truths of religion in the form of a dogma is inadequate, or it may be evidence of the inadequacy of a prevailing tendency of thought in science or metaphysics; it really does not affect the truth of the religious experience which the dogma professes to account for.

To sum up, the authority of Catholicism is in the first place the person of Jesus, as in some sense the revelation of God to man; in the second place, it is the general Catholic system of religious practice as the means of attaining to unity with God through Him in the spiritual life (it goes without saying that this includes the necessity of accepting His teaching in the sphere of ethics both in theory and in practice); in the third place, it is the general system of Catholic doctrine as the best explanation of the nature of God and His relations to man as

implied in the person of Jesus and the Catholic system of religion. The extent of the authority of any particular element in that system of doctrine depends on the extent to which it is really an integral part of the whole system of faith and practice and on the extent to which its claim to be an integral part has been proved by the general experience of Christendom: the fact that it has been formally promulgated by some authority which claims to speak in the name of the whole Church constitutes an *a priori* reason for regarding it with the utmost respect, but the extent of this respect will largely depend on the extent to which the authority promulgating it is really representative of the whole of Christian opinion and not merely of one particular aspect of it.

WILFRED L. KNOX.

ROMAN CANON LAW AND THE ENGLISH CHURCH

IN the present Anglican crisis, a single false step may have disastrous effects; and certain appeals have recently been made to Canon Law which, to all historians with whom I have been able to compare notes, seem fundamentally false. Mr. A. Ogle's *Canon Law in Mediæval England*, Mr. J. V. Bullard's article in THEOLOGY for August, 1927, his speech in York Convocation, and the Report presented to that Convocation by a committee under his chairmanship, have all one general aim, the discrediting of F. W. Maitland's theory as to the attitude of the English Church towards Roman Canon Law in the Middle Ages.

Not, of course, that there is the least reason why Maitland should not be discredited if he is in the wrong. When Mr. Bullard says that "any suggestion of further exploration is habitually dismissed by those in authority" with the phrase "Maitland can't be wrong," he is far from understanding the real attitude of modern historians. They only feel that Maitland's work will bear comparison with that of any English legal historian who ever lived; and that whoever wishes to refute him must make very sure of his own ground.

Stubbs himself realized this clearly enough. In so far as he ever attempted an answer to Maitland, this was confined to one brief footnote, and two pages of small print thrust into an obscure corner of the last edition of his *Seventeen Lectures*. In that appendix, while defending lamely and half-heartily some fragments of his original theory, he confessed: "I have so

great respect for [Prof. Maitland's] knowledge, critical insight, and fairness, that I would gladly submit to any amount of adjustment of facts and authorities that he might prescribe to me. . . . In [my main thesis] I may have been quite wrong . . . I leave [these lectures] accordingly to the corrections of competent authority, gladly submitting to be set right." No historian with a reputation to lose, so far as I am aware, has ever publicly taken Stubbs's side against Maitland. The late Professor H. W. C. Davis,* and Professor A. Hamilton Thompson,† have cast emphatic votes for him. Hastings Rashdall actually anticipated Maitland here; and I find that four distinguished mediævalists at Cambridge, three of whom represent different phases of Anglicanism, all feel Stubbs's position to be untenable.

Let us therefore briefly review the two positions. On certain points there is complete agreement. The real founder of the study of Canon Law in England was Archbishop Theobald of Canterbury (1139-61). From Stephen Langton's Council of Oxford onwards (1222), a series of decrees were issued for the Province of Canterbury, partly by Archbishops sitting in council and partly by Papal Legates. These were, of course, carefully preserved, and referred to by Canon lawyers. The legatine decrees were provided with a systematic commentary by John of Ayton, Canon of Lincoln, who died in 1350. In 1430, a far more comprehensive work was finished by another canonist, William Lyndwood, who taught at Cambridge and died as Bishop of St. Davids in 1446. This book, which he called *Provinciale*, aimed at codifying all the legatine and archiepiscopal decrees under headings corresponding to those in general Canon Law, and at providing a full commentary for practical use. This book was so excellently adapted to its purpose, and supplied so much more information than any predecessor, that in 1462 the Convocation of York province accepted these southern decrees as authoritative whenever they did not conflict with the northern. From thenceforward the English Church had its own lawbook, in some sense official, and in some sense comparable to that papal *Corpus Juris Canonici* (Gratian and the Decretals) which formed the *jus commune* of the Roman Catholic Church. In *some* sense; but in *what* sense? That is where Stubbs and Maitland differed. Stubbs held that the English Church adopted an independent attitude. "A knowledge of [Roman Canon Law] was the scientific equipment of the ecclesiastical jurist [in mediæval England]; but the texts were not authoritative." "Gratian and the Decretals are not

* *Zeitschrift d. Savigny-Stiftung* xxxiv. iii (1913) pp. 344 ff (a paper read at the International Historical Congress).

† *Essays Catholic and Critical* (1926), pp. 352 ff.

formally or explicitly received as having authority in England." This latter statement he modified in the light of Maitland's criticisms: "The great compilations are not formally and explicitly received in England," with an apologetic footnote (p. 351): "The reception may have been a matter of course." And, indeed, there is every reason why it should have been a matter of course. When Boniface VIII. proclaimed to Christendom that all law was contained within the Pope's breast, no orthodox English churchman dared to whisper a doubt: they accepted it as a matter of course. Maitland writes: "I have been unable to find any passage in which either John of Ayton or Lyndwood denies, disputes, or even debates the binding force of any decretal." Stubbs himself did not profess to produce any such passage; nor, I believe, has either of his two recent defenders. Archbishop Pecham, a prelate very sensitive to certain Roman abuses, and quite bold enough to speak out on occasion, proclaimed to the English clergy that "those whom Peter binds with the chains of his laws are bound in the palace of the supreme and heavenly Emperor"; Papal law is God's law. In 1515, a friar named Henry Standish was summoned before the Convocation of Canterbury to answer for certain objectionable opinions, one of which was "that a constitution ordained by the pope and the clergy do not bind any region wherein custom hath always run to the contrary . . . the positive laws of the Church bind only those who receive them." Here we have exactly Stubbs's position, that Roman law cannot overrule Anglican customs, and that it binds only those regions which have explicitly and formally "received" it. Yet so far was Convocation from approving this doctrine, that, when Standish told the story later on, it was in these words: "What should one poor friar do against all the bishops and the clergy of England?" Upon this Maitland comments, "No doubt, as men will in such cases, he was exaggerating his isolation; but certainly he defended himself very ill if he had only been repeating a commonplace of the English canonists." How, then, does Stubbs explain this Standish matter? He entirely ignores it here; his single allusion to Standish's case is in another lecture, and in a quite different connection.

For Stubbs, all the while, was on a wrong scent, which he apparently failed to correct even when Maitland had indicated it with the clearest precision. Stubbs's trump-card was "the great dictum of the Council of Merton in 1236 . . . *Nolumus leges Angliæ mutari*." This was, it is true, a flat rebellion against Roman Canon Law; and the rebels took shelter under English law. But who were the rebels, and what was the English law which they asserted? It was the *baronage* who were thus

refusing to allow English *civil* law to be altered at the pleasure of a Pope. This teaches us nothing; nobody has ever doubted the imperfect agreement of the English laity, as of every other laity, with many clerical claims and arrangements; the only real question is: Did the *Ecclesia Anglicana* ever assert her independence from Rome at any time between the Conquest and the Reformation? To confuse this attitude of the baronage in 1236 with the attitude of the clergy, is almost as serious as to assume that the parliamentary opposition to Reservation in 1928 represented a clerical opposition. What did the clergy themselves, in 1236, feel about this changing of English laws in obedience to Rome? It was Grosseteste of Lincoln, the most fearless champion of English independence wherever he felt English independence to be right, who, at this council of Merton, actually proposed and pressed the surrender to Roman Law, even though it was only newly-made Roman Law. Moreover, Grosseteste here spoke as the mouthpiece of the whole episcopate. More still, in another place he made concessions to Rome which, as Maitland points out, went far to cut the ground from under his feet when he tried to resist some of the least justifiable of Roman trespasses. Canon lawyers had gradually arrived at the teaching that all Church benefices in the world belonged to the Roman Pontiff, to confer on whomsoever he would. The Pope, in accordance with this theory, made appointments which, as Grosseteste protested, exposed the English clergy to derision and hatred, and were a scandal to all men (Ep. 49). Grosseteste protests his willingness to undertake any really edifying job; in spite of his infirmities, he would willingly obey a command to go and preach to the Saracens; he is ready to give from his own income as much as, or more than, the value of the prebend which the Pope now demands for this foreigner. He says plainly that whosoever misuses this Papal power over all clerical endowments "edifieth unto the fires of hell"; yet the plenitude of that legal power is a thing which he does not question for one moment. So far is he from asserting Anglican independence from even this most oppressive Roman law, that he confesses the legal obligation in words which no Pope ever outdid: "I know, as I know truly, that the Lord Pope and the Holy Roman Church have this power which enableth them to deal freely with all ecclesiastical benefices." If, indeed, the English clergy asserted their freedom to receive, or not receive, the Roman law, then Grosseteste's attitude is no more explicable than that of the 1515 Convocation which ruled unanimously against Standish's assertion of Bishop Stubbs's theory. Yet this, his 49th Epistle, is ignored by Stubbs, by Mr. Ogle, and by Mr. Bullard, though Maitland's plain quotation gives

them no excuse for shutting their eyes to it. Here, indeed, lies one great difficulty for any defender of Maitland at the present moment. Some readers of this present article might ask themselves: "What can possibly be urged against arguments which, quite apart from Maitland's great personal authority, seem so clear and conclusive in themselves?" And we must answer that we do not know; we only know that these points have not, in fact, been answered; what Maitland's critics might plead, if they were compelled explicitly to meet those points, we have no means of declaring.

And yet we may, perhaps, form some conjecture, from a study of the points which have actually been assailed. These critics, who have so inexplicably shirked Maitland's very striking quotations, have yet attacked in other quarters (which they presumably chose as more vulnerable), by methods which may throw some light upon their mentality and their historical equipment.

Both harp upon the same argument; the *Ecclesia Anglicana* possessed certain peculiar customs of her own; therefore she was independent of Roman law, except in so far as she chose to accept it. Yet both critics are aware that Roman law makes explicit allowance for local custom, and that Maitland emphasizes this. In fact, it is an integral part of Maitland's theory. As against Stubbs, who maintains that the laws made in English provincial councils were in effect statute-law for England, Maitland insists that they were rather bye-laws, of the kind which our railway companies, universities and colleges now make, subject to the common law of England. He points out how English legists, like those of other countries, when they speak of the *jus commune* of the Church, mean Roman Canon Law. His critics, therefore, in order to breach his position, are compelled to show some real and striking conflict between our English constitutions or customs, on the one hand, and this *jus commune* on the other. But here, as it seems to me, they fail most signally. It is not only that the instances they choose are sometimes trifling, so that, even though the incompatibility were most apparent, it might easily be replied that here, as in many other cases, Rome was politic enough to waive her unquestioned theoretical rights, and to ignore small anomalies in this distant England. Not only this, but some of their supposed anomalies are simply mares' nests. For instance, here is a point upon which both lay great stress. In the Decretal *Vas Electionis*, Benedict XII. commanded that an archdeacon should *not* demand, for his visitation fees, *more than* 50 *sols tournois*, which were the equivalent of 12s. 6d. sterling. English custom was to grant him 7s. 6d. for himself, 1s. 6d. for

his horse, and for each extra horse with its rider 1s. No arch-deacon, as a rule, would go to the expense of more than one or two attendants; therefore, in ordinary cases, English custom would give him only 11s. at most. Here and there he might bring three mounted attendants, and so run up to 12s.; but anything beyond that is scarcely worth contemplating. Yet our critics, either unable to calculate the value of medieval money, or blind to the fact that the Pope's tariff indicates only a *maximum*, absurdly treat this as a case where English custom overrides Papal law! And Mr. Ogle emphasizes the blunder, in his further comments, by asserting that English bishops did not, in fact, visit particular churches and exact procurations; upon this assertion he builds another accusation of ignorance against Maitland (p. 78). Yet the fact is that the bishops did visit and did exact procurations when it suited them; to give two instances almost at random, Gynewell of Lincoln did so all through the Black Death, and Islip of Canterbury did the same just after the plague had gone by. When, again, Mr. Bullard is so incensed to find Maitland differing from him that he is constrained to cry aloud, "The audacity of the man!" here it is unfortunately only his own almost incredible ignorance that is at fault. For he actually believes that the technical law-term *Decretals* can refer to the decisions of an ordinary provincial council; whereas even a beginner in Canon Law can scarcely fail to discover that the term is always reserved for the Pope's solemn decrees, and for those alone. Indeed, any careful reader of Stubbs's lectures and Maitland's little book must realize that both authors assume this to be the only possible sense of the word. The mistake is as gross as to imagine that a modern railway company's bye-laws can be quoted in legal arguments as Statutes of the Realm. And, stranger still, this crucial word *Decretal* is formally defined on the very page of Lyndwood's *Provinciale* which Mr. Bullard professes to be discussing. Lyndwood there writes (p. 272a, cf. p. 299a): "We call *Decretum* that which the Pope has decreed by advice of his cardinals without consulting any [other]. . . . A *Decretalis Epistola* is that which the Pope has decreed either by himself alone or with his cardinals in consultation with some [other]. . . . And note that the *Decretales* of the Popes have the same authority as the *Decreta* which are put together in the *Corpus Canonum*"—i.e., in Canon Law. For this last assertion, Lyndwood sends us on to an authority which Mr. Bullard, if indeed he looked at the words at all, has evidently not understood for lack of familiarity with the ordinary conventional methods of reference in Canon Law. That authority is the 19th and 20th distinctions of Gratian's *Decretum*, the first book of the *Corpus Juris Canonici*.

Here we find, among other similar statements, that *Decretales Epistolae* must be reckoned among Canonical Scriptures, since (as Gratian notes) "they are Scriptures of the Apostolic See." So that this page of Lyndwood, which, from Mr. Bullard's peculiar angle of vision, seems to convict Maitland of audacious misstatement, does, in fact, afford one of the strongest proofs of his theory. For that page recites, and comments on, a pronouncement of the Archbishop of Canterbury, in his council of 1408, to the effect that all men are heretics who assert "the contrary to that which hath been determined by the Church: viz., in the Decrees, the Decretals, or in Our own Provincial Constitutions." These provincial constitutions of Canterbury come in here only under the shadow of Decrees and Decretals. Similarly, in modern England, I could be proclaimed as lawless for repudiating, not only a Statute of the Realm, but also a bye-law of my own College; since those bye-laws are in accordance with, and owe their binding force to, the Statutes.

And, though much more might be said in defence of Maitland's thesis and in exposure of the ignorance of his critics, I beg leave to end upon this personal note: Mr. Bullard quotes me as having "noticed this defect" (i.e., F. W. Maitland's "distaste for ecclesiastical sources of information") "in several passages which occurred in *Five Centuries of Religion*." The fact is that, in those two volumes, I mention him only once, as the single English medievalist great enough to be put by the side of two eminent continental scholars whom I name. I can only suppose that Mr. Bullard here refers (though, even so, inaccurately) to my four comments on the grandfather, S. R. Maitland; these two men being about as different as the elder and the younger Pitt. Again, he quotes me as agreeing with him about Eudes Rigaud's *Diary*, and informs the public that this *Diary* may be found in vol. 23 of the *Recueil des historiens de la Gaule*. The document printed in that volume is Rigaud's *Pouillé*, a book no more identical with his *Diary* than Lamb's *Essays* are with his *Letters*; if Mr. Bullard had ever had both books in his hands, he could not possibly have made this astounding assertion. And I must emphatically repudiate the deductions which he draws from the *Diary* (or rather, from my translation of a few pages from that book), and which he couples with my name, in his speech before the Northern Convocation.

G. G. COULTON.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

WE have received a copy of the second impression of Lord Halifax's pamphlet entitled *Dislocation of the Canon*, in which he pleads for the permissive use of the liturgy of 1549. So far as the Canon alone is concerned, we agree entirely with the plea that such a step would be far the simplest and most pacific solution of this perplexed problem; nor do we doubt that, if the field were clear, Convocation would approve it. Lord Halifax makes the important point, moreover, that the ordinary worshipper would very quickly find himself at home with it. Unfortunately, however, the field is not clear; and a satisfactory solution may have to wait until other issues—those of a constitutional kind—have been settled.

The Bishop of Southampton has published a series of five addresses delivered in Winchester Cathedral, under the title of *Church and World: First Principles for Present Perplexities* (Warren and Sons, Winchester, 6d. net.). They have all the robust commonsense and fidelity to principle which we associate with Dr. Boutflower; and what is involved in the ideal of a National Church, in the world but not of it, is here powerfully set forth. The addresses pierce below the phrases of the day to the permanent realities of the Church's life; and they should be valuable at this time to clergy as the basis of courses of instruction.

Dr. Coulton's article published in this number makes it opportune to draw attention to a little pamphlet, by the Rev. A. T. Cameron (Faith Press, 3d. net), entitled *Canon Law and its Relation to English Ecclesiastical Law*. The author makes plain many of the factors which contribute to the present tangled position of English Church law.

We have been asked to draw our readers' attention to the Fifth International Congress for the History of Religions which is to be held at Lund, Sweden, from August 27 to 29, 1929. Membership is open to all who are interested; and those desiring to take part are asked to communicate with Dr. E. Briem, Lund, Sweden. The main subjects for this year's series will be "The Soul-Concept in the History of Religions" and "Old Norse Religion."

Our contemporary, *The Churchman*, contains an interesting article from the pen of Mr. Albert Mitchell entitled "A Liturgical Essay," containing a suggested Order of Holy Communion to be used when Morning Prayer has not been said previously. Its chief interest lies in the candid recognition by a staunch Evangelical that the needs of Sunday worship are not met by eleven o'clock Mattins, preceded (or not) by an early celebration at eight. The arrangement of the Ante-Communion recalls the Ambrosian rite in the provision of a Lesson from the Prophets in

addition to the Epistle and Gospel, and of Psalms and Canticles between these different lections. A Psalm is also suggested as an Introit. For the rest, the liturgy of 1662 is followed with only slight verbal changes, except that a prayer for the assistance of the Holy Spirit is added before the Canon; and there is a new rubric after the Prayer for the Church Militant directing those "who are unprepared to receive the Holy Communion at this time" to withdraw from "that part of the Church in which the Holy Sacrament of Christ's Body and Blood is to be ministered." There are obvious difficulties about a rubric of this kind, of which Mr. Mitchell is probably not unaware; just as he does not seem to realize the cogent reasons there are for restoring to the Canon its lost and separated parts. But his reconstruction of the Ante-Communion seems to us to be really valuable, and to be the best suggestion of its kind that we have seen.

We should be glad to hear of any reader who would be willing to send his copy of THEOLOGY each month to an Indian priest working in the diocese of Dornakal.

NOTE

CHURCH STATISTICS

(Communicated)

THE unreliability of statistics is proverbial, and most priests dislike filling up statistical returns. Still more do they distrust the figures when compiled; rightly they dread the temptation to spiritual pride which comes when numbers are on the upgrade, and say Quality rather than Quantity is their watchword. But there is always a danger of closing one's eyes to unpleasant facts. Perhaps our statistical tables should be used to warn us when the results are unfavourable and should be discounted when they are favourable. Perhaps, however, occasionally in moments of depression one may allow himself to be cheered by evidences, however slight, of progress.

With some such thoughts in his mind the writer began to study the figures given in the official Year Book of the Church of England for 1929, and to compare them with those given in the 1924 Year Book. The period of five years is long enough for the purpose of comparison, and the point of departure is long enough after the War to give time for the reversion to normal habits. Further, the value of money has appreciated a little, but not much, during the quinquennium. The periods to which the figures refer are in each case the year following a great industrial upheaval when, in some parishes at least, special difficulties might be expected.

Voluntary offerings are given as £9,053,055 in the 1924 Book, £9,910,683 in that of 1929, an increase of nearly 10 per cent. Of the latter sum £526,618, a little over 5 per cent., was raised by Diocesan Finance Schemes. The old methods of Church finance in the parishes and Church Societies are still responsible for an overwhelming proportion of the funds contributed in spite of the great stress laid by authority on the official methods. The increase in contributions to Missions Overseas is approximately £100,000 (£1,250,000 has gone up to £1,350,000), perhaps hardly com-

mensurate with the tremendous efforts put forth. By the side of this increase we may set the striking Anglican figures for the Metropolitan Hospital Sunday collections—£35,320 out of £48,487 at the earlier date, £25,096 out of £35,744 at the later—which suggest that Churchpeople are concentrating more upon specifically Church activities as an object for gifts offered at the altar. The usual explanation, that not so much can be expected from the depleted congregations, is not adequate in view of the increase in other directions.

The deacons ordained have fallen from 463 to 385; the normal number of assistant Curacies has fallen from 4,652 to 4,305 in *two* years. The figure was not available for the 1924 Book.

When we come to the Communion made in Easter week we find that 2,294,190 has increased by 234,203 to 2,528,393. That is to say, the rise is about 10 per cent., substantially more than the estimated increase of population during the period. The scantiness of our congregations will restrain any impulse to rejoice, but at least we may claim that much faithful work is being done by the diminished band of clergy, that our congregations, such as they are, recognize the duty of communicating, and that the lamentable recent controversies have not to any extent alienated the faithful.

The figures for Infant Baptisms bear out this contention in an almost startling fashion. In the five years they have fallen from 511,449 to 432,487. But in the whole of England and Wales the Baptisms work out at 69.06 of the Births registered, a higher figure than in the preceding years, and substantially higher than in pre-war years. This is really remarkable. Well over two-thirds of all the children born are brought to baptism in our churches.* It is clear that the real problem is not so much intellectual alienation from the Faith as the influences leading to the decay of Sunday worship. Confirmations have fallen in the five years from 218,196 to 213,040, a much smaller rate of decrease than that of the children in Sunday Schools. The percentage of male candidates in the last 30 years has been 41.54. Last year it was 43.04, in the three preceding years 42.88, 42.12, 42.01 respectively. Is this a tiny little straw indicating that the sexes are being equalized in religious matters and that we can no longer rely on women being "the devout sex"?

Can we go further and deduce any lessons from the experiences of separate dioceses? Let us take five populous dioceses, each of them rapidly growing and each with a strongly marked diocesan policy. London is noted for the variety of experiment that has been allowed within its borders; Southwark has the same problems as London, but Prayer Book standards have been enforced; Birmingham is ruled by a Diocesan out of sympathy with many of his clergy; Manchester has had one of the most powerful personalities in the Church as its Bishop; Liverpool has been criticized for concentrating on its vast Cathedral to the detriment of parochial extension. For the sake of brevity we give only the figures for Easter Communicants and Confirmations. The year in each case is the latest available for the compilers of the 1924 and 1929 Year Books.

* The decline in the birth-rate is especially marked in sections of the middle class entirely alienated from religion. If Churchpeople fulfil the obligations of married life and the present preference of cars to children continues the proportion of Baptisms to Births will presumably rise. We presume that the relative strength of the various religious bodies remains stable.

		<i>Communicants.</i>		<i>Confirmations.</i>	
		(1924).	(1929).	(1924).	(1929).
London	188,537	179,773	15,737	14,580
Southwark	118,389	121,858	8,790	10,161
Birmingham	44,438	45,146	5,007	3,539
Manchester	162,020	184,849	15,925	16,448
Liverpool	70,510	79,856	9,572	8,919

A wholesome warning against premature conclusions is given when we look at the last Confirmation figures appearing in the 1923 Book: Had we made our first date a year earlier the London Confirmations in the third column would have been 14,945 and the Southwark 10,282, and the apparent advantage of Southwark would have disappeared. We must credit the Lancashire Dioceses with their zeal (for this purpose in the second and fourth columns Manchester and Blackburn figures have been added), but must not forget that each year more London Churchmen make their Easter Communion outside their own Diocese. Making allowance for this, we shall probably be right in concluding that the progress of the Church, at least for a few years, depends but little on the official policy of the Diocese.

Anyhow we may expect Sunday Schools to run by their own momentum, apart from the personality of the Bishop. The loss in Sunday School scholars under 15 in five years is 114,479 (1,955,838 in the 1924 Book, 1,841,359 in 1929)—apparently slightly more in proportion than the fall in the available child population. Now let us look at our Dioceses:

		(1924).	(1929).
London	174,820	152,449
Southwark	114,467	102,687
Birmingham	53,395	49,056
Manchester (and Blackburn)	..	181,580	168,021
Liverpool	87,470	84,571

Except that London has lost proportionately more than the others there is little difference to be seen here.

A glance at a remote rural Diocese reveals interesting results. Truro suffers from a declining rural population, but it has for its Bishop a member of a religious Community. How far has this experiment "alienated the laity"? The decline of the birth-rate is shown by the Infant Baptisms—3,059 have fallen to 2,622. But the Sunday School scholars have risen from 12,677 to 12,989, the Confirmations from 1,798 to 1,894, and the Communicants from 18,312 to 24,014.

Lastly a few words about the Church in Wales. Besides struggling with the difficulties of Disestablishment it has had the industrial sorrows of South Wales and the hard times of its rural districts. While Baptisms and Sunday scholars have fallen at much the same rate as in England, those enrolled in Bible classes have increased, there are more Sunday School teachers, and Easter Communicants have risen from 162,763 to 187,178.

These are lean years for organized religion in our land. We console ourselves sometimes with saying that there is a great deal of vague religious sentiment, which is better than nothing. But statistics show that the organized Church of England, if she is not making any real headway, is at least holding her own.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society. Vol. viii., No. 4.

S. H. Stephen, writing on Palestinian Customs and Folklore, gives an interesting article on the use of the number forty. Forty is a "household number in frequent use"; it stands for a concrete quantity as against the indeterminate "some" or "many," and is used to denote the idea of a large amount. It is, of course, frequent in the Old Testament, and is found in the Koran—e.g., "forty nights," "forty years." Mohammed received his call at the age of forty. Among Christians the use of forty appears in the following: the forty days of Lent; Candlemas—forty days after Christmas; forty days of prayer and contemplation before and after ordinations among the Armenians. The Orthodox have a feast of the Forty Martyrs, on the eve of which forty candles are burnt in their honour by pious families.

Dr. W. F. Albright writes on Professor Sethe's important discovery and decipherment of Egyptian inscriptions in ink on earthenware vessels. The inscriptions are curses on all rebels against Egyptian rule and the authority of Pharaoh. The vessels on which the curses were written were broken with solemn ceremony, their destruction symbolizing the crushing of the rebels (Jeremiah xix. 10). Sethe dates these inscriptions at about 2,000 B.C. If this is correct it follows from the list of rebel chiefs and their towns that the sphere of Egyptian influence extended over Phoenicia and Palestine at this period; also the occurrence of Amorite and Semitic names suggests an extensive Amorite settlement as well as the presence of a strong Semitic element in the Holy Land.

Dr. Albright is confident that further skilful examination and interpretation of these inscriptions will help to lift the veil that lies over the dawn of history in Palestine.

R. D. MIDDLETON.

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses. October, 1928.

The two principal articles in the October number of this Review are—one on the "Relation of the Book of Deuteronomy and the Reforms of King Josiah," by Fr. J. Coppens, and another on the "Concept of the Divine Maternity of Mary in the Period Anterior to the Nestorian Controversy."

Coppens contends for the Mosaic character of Deuteronomy. It is anterior to the reforms of Josiah, which did not, indeed, constitute any revolution in Israelitish worship. We cannot consider Deuteronomy, Hilkiah's "Book of the Law," as a work composed with a view to effecting some radical transformation of the religious and cult traditions of the nation. The book presupposes rather than introduces a concentration of worship at Jerusalem, but that is not the special object of deuteronomic legislation. Josiah's reforms turned principally on the purification and restoration of the Temple and the declaration of the unlawfulness of private shrines.

The other article on the Divine Maternity of our Lady is by Fr. Clément, Redemptorist, and reviews the period before the Council of Ephesus in 431 from various angles. The author contends that the ideas expressed by the term "Theotokos" were part of the common tradition of Christianity among the *simplices* and the *idiota* as well as among the learned. The refusal of this title to Mary by Nestorius caused an outburst of popular indignation. The Christian tradition on this subject is attested by

inscriptions and liturgy as well as by the works of theologians, and, indeed, even the heretical sects bear witness to it. Among Christian writers, John of Antioch, Alexander of Hierapolis, and even Theodore of Mopsuestia show that the term was usual at the time, though of course it was not always interpreted in the same sense. An equivalent expression, θεοῦ μήτηρ κόρη, was used by Constantine as reported by Eusebius.

The testimony of the monuments shows the same underlying thought. The early second century fresco of the cemetery of Priscilla at Rome depicts the Blessed Virgin seated with the Holy Child at her breast; in other pictures she, with her Son, receives the homage of the Magi. A Greco-Egyptian "stele" of the fourth century bears the inscription θεοτόκος. The history of the dedications of churches in the pre-Nestorian period is obscure, but it seems probable that there were some, especially in Egypt, dedicated to the Mother of God in that period. At Ephesus the Church in which the Council met was probably so dedicated. At Rome, under the now demolished Church of S. Maria Liberatrice, an inscription of the old church, S. Maria Antiqua, was found "Sanctæ Dei Genetrici semperque Virgini Mariæ." Grisar dates this under Pope Sylvester, 314-335.

Fr. Clément also passes in review the evidence for early festivals of our Lady, especially the Feast of the Annunciation. This seems to have been kept at Constantinople before the time of Ephesus. Finally, the Collyridian heresy itself bears witness to the popular ideas of those times of which it is a perversion.

Other interesting articles deal with the Doctrine of Grace in S. Thomas and with the history of the Feast of the Transfiguration of our Lord.

W. R. V. BRADE.

Anglican Theological Review. Vol. xi., No. 2, 1928.

This number of the *Anglican Theological Review* opens with an article by a young English Liberal theologian on "The Vital Principle of Anglicanism." Despite the American appearance of the name and address, we may recognize in Thomas L. Harris, Ann Arbor, Michigan, a friend, sometime of Jesus College, Cambridge, and Westcott House. Liberalism is tolerated within the Anglican Church provided it is moderate liberalism; just as Anglo-Catholicism is tolerated provided it is moderate Anglo-Catholicism. But it is harder to understand why, though distrusted, more radical minds remain loyal to the Anglican Communion. Thomas L. Harris has a radical mind. His liberalism is not of the order of the sentimental Jesus-of-history piety that authority smiles upon. To such a mind a Liberal Protestant sect might seem more attractive. But this has not been the case. Thomas L. Harris explains in effect why Anglicanism has retained his loyalty. He sees in Anglicanism a denomination peculiarly fitted to contribute to a thoroughly liberal and modernist Church of the future. "First," he says, "there is the backward-looking glance of history, the sense of continuity and the poise and balance that come from a knowledge of history; second, there is the institutional element, the new bottle to contain the new wine; third, there is a wise dogmatism akin to the dogmatism of science. Religion must have a theology, it must have something to teach, if it is not to degenerate into a feeble emotionalism dependent on 'dim religious lights,' altar candles, revivalist hymns, and other such trimmings before each renewal; and the

thing most worth teaching is the common sense of the whole Church, our religious social heritage, the normal religious experience of normal men, clarified, co-ordinated, philosophized, by capable men themselves in touch with the common experience of which they treat. Finally, Anglicanism has kept sacramental worship and has kept it largely unencumbered by a scholastic philosophy which has become unintelligible and so apparently untrue and meaningless to the modern world." The whole article is a valuable argument for historic Christianity from a young liberal, and too often liberalism is contemptuous of the historical, the institutional, the dogmatic, and the sacramental elements in Christianity. But it is just on these elements that Mr. Harris insists.

In this number of the *Anglican Theological Review* William S. Bishop discusses Christology under the title, "Is there a New Testament Doctrine of Assumption?" There is also a particularly interesting article on "Chassidism and Zaddokism," by John A. Maynard. Chassidism is a pietistic movement within Judaism, a movement which began in the eighteenth century. W. W. Stewart writes on "The Mystical Movement in the Middle Ages." Herbert H. Gowan supplies the clergy with a course of reading on "Spiritual Movements in Oriental Religions." Finally, there are some thirty pages of reviews.

J. O. C.

Theologische Blätter. December.

The present position of the Mandæan question is reviewed by Prof. E. Peterson. He refers to Prof. Burkitt's recent article in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, and comes to similar conclusions as to the relations of the Mandæans to primitive Christianity. Like the Manichees, they could not have been more than a corrupt following of the Apostles.

Various writers on the Church as a spiritual community or organism are discussed by W. Macholz.

REVIEWS

A NEW COMMENTARY ON HOLY SCRIPTURE: INCLUDING THE APOCRYPHA. Edited by Charles Gore, H. L. Goudge, and A. Guillaume. (London: S.P.C.K.) 16s.

What is it that one expects from a Commentary on Holy Scripture in one volume? To what type of reader should the Editors address themselves? Obviously, in these days of high prices and low incomes, to those of the clergy who, without pretending to be scholars, wish to keep abreast of recent investigation and thought about the Scriptures; and to the educated layman who, with no time for intensive reading of Commentaries on the separate books of the Bible, nevertheless wishes to achieve and retain an intelligent view of it as a whole. Judged by these tests the New Commentary is a most successful achievement. In binding, printing, and paper it compares favourably with its predecessors—most favourably indeed with one of them; in price it does not greatly exceed them. All concerned in the technical make-up of the volume are heartily to be congratulated. Misprints, of course, are inevitable in an undertaking of this size, and do, as a matter of fact, occur rather frequently; this, however, can be corrected in reprinting. In general, the book is a pleasure to the eye, and though naturally bulky not very awkward to handle.

The most original and acceptable feature of the Commentary is the inclusion of the Apocrypha. This justifies itself many times over. Dr. Bevan's introductory essay—covering the whole social, political, intellectual, and religious background of the period—is a masterpiece of compression; the single column, for example, allotted to Philo constitutes a perfect miniature of character-drawing. The essay has a pendant in Dr. Oesterley's fuller account of Rabbinism and Eschatology, at the beginning of the New Testament section. The introductions to the several books are very ample, and if the commentary on the text, as for example in 2(4) Esdras and Ecclesiasticus, has had to be severely compressed, the treatment is still ample enough for those readers—and there will be many—to whom the Apocrypha has hitherto been all but a closed book.

The Old Testament Commentary reflects the stability which scholarship has now achieved in this department. Too little prominence, perhaps, is assigned to the problem of the date of Deuteronomy; but it is made perfectly clear that there is such a

problem, and that it is important. Of outstanding importance is Dr. James's essay on "The Comparative Study of the Old Testament"—a very clear and comprehensive treatment of recent anthropological and archæological investigations in their bearing upon Semitic religion and cultus. Equally inspiring, though in a different way, is Professor Burkitt's study of prophecy and the prophets. The use of the Balaam-cycle of oracles to illustrate the genesis and character of Hebrew prophecy is peculiarly happy. But Professor Burkitt seems to have been hampered by editorial requirements. After tracing the growth of prophecy to Elijah and Elisha, he breaks off into short paragraphs dealing with the several minor prophets, which cover in the main the same grounds as the later "introductions" (by other writers) to the texts of the respective books. It is true that he arranges the minor prophets roughly in their historical order, but the method of treatment spoils the great comprehensive view of the whole subject which he had begun to sketch out, and the effect is further marred by the fact that he does not touch the four great prophetic books at all. A fine opportunity to deal with prophecy as a whole—from its first appearance to its extinction—has thus been lost; with it apparently has gone all reference to Dr. Robinson's important theory of the place of ecstasy in relation to the oracles of the writing prophets. Another advance of modern scholarship—the study of the liturgical influence in the composition of the Psalter—receives less attention than it deserves in the section of the Commentary allotted to the Psalms; indeed, this section as a whole, though deeply devotional, is so little concerned with literary questions as to stand somewhat aloof from the rest of the volume.

It must be admitted that the broad lines of treatment in the New Testament Commentary are less satisfactory than those in the Old Testament. This, of course, is scarcely to be wondered at; scholarship is still far more at a loss for its bearings in the New Testament than in the Old. The historicity of Hezekiah's reformation (for example) is a matter of no more than scholarly interest; we can discuss its pros and cons without anxiety as to the issue. But few of us are prepared to approach the problem of the Empty Tomb with the same freedom from anxiety, because we have not as yet solved the prior question as to how far our faith *does*, as a fact, depend upon historicity here. I suppose that every New Testament student has in his own heart of hearts a dividing-line between the problems which he is prepared to treat as *adiaphora*, and those in which he has a more than speculative interest; and that no two students draw the line at the same place. And though we hope we shall never

find ourselves actually saying "Such and such an hypothesis is one that I do not feel myself free to discuss," honesty compels us to admit that at times, at least, discussions may be embarrassed, and even judgments obscured, by the fact that we *hope* to be saved from such and such a conclusion.

Embarrassment of this kind hangs over a good deal of the New Testament section of the Commentary. There is no clear agreement between the contributors as to the questions which they shall treat as open; there is not always agreement, even, as to the mode of approach towards open questions. This shows itself, on occasion, in a series of "afterthoughts" or "additional notes" which are bound to confuse the reader, and betray a certain editorial indecision, although they testify to the complete frankness of the contributors. It is surely evident that, with complete openness of approach, *one* introductory article should suffice for each of the books and each of the main problems of the New Testament. Such an article would expound the various theories held by different schools of critics, exhibit the strong and weak points in the evidence in either direction, and (after indicating the writer's own conclusion) leave the reader in a position to make up his own mind. But where a *second* essay has been added to the first by another hand, it suggests either that the first is inadequate or unfair, or that the second is near to being intrusive. It is all to the good that two scholars of such eminence as Dr. Lock and Dr. Harris should write on the authorship and date of the Fourth Gospel; but it would surely have been better still if they had collaborated in a single introduction, rather than dividing their forces into two essays, one at the beginning and the other at the end of the Commentary on the text. The same applies with even greater force in the case of the Apocalypse. Dr. Crafer, in the introductory essay, says that "a return has been made to the recognition that the book is a unity," and relies on "that form of internal evidence which appeals to the devout as well as to the learned." Dr. Goudge, on the other hand, in an admirable appended note, pleads for the view that "prophecies of different dates are to be found there"; and although he speaks of their having been "rearranged" into a "literary unity," it is difficult to see, in the light of his analysis, what kind of "literary unity" could have been demanded or secured by the "rearrangement" in question. The introductory essay and the appended note appear, as they stand, to be in flat contradiction to each other. They represent legitimately opposed points of view which should have been contrasted in an impartial introduction. The two essays would have presented a far stronger account of the question had they been combined in one.

In the instances just quoted, there is little to regret except superficial confusion—no reader can complain that he has been left in ignorance. In other parts of the Commentary, unfortunately, the same cannot be said. Particularly is this the case with the treatment of the Synoptic Gospels. Early in 1926, Sir Edwyn Hoskyns pointed out (*Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 163) the importance of the new *formgeschichtliche* school of criticism in Germany associated with the names of Schmidt, Dibelius and Bultmann. Dr. Easton's important book on this subject—which concerns (as is well known) the pre-literary stage of gospel composition—appeared too late to be used by writers in the Commentary; but Dr. Rawlinson had already made considerable employment of the method involved in his *St Mark*. The problem deserved, in our opinion, as full a treatment as many others which have a place of their own in the Commentary, for it touches issues of supreme importance. Not only has it failed to receive such treatment, but of the two Commentaries on St Mark and St Matthew's Gospel respectively, the former stoutly resists the slightest incursion of "form-criticism," whilst the latter employs it in the most startling and novel fashion. And it is disconcerting to find that not by a single sentence do the editors suggest that there is anything but identity of approach in the treatment of the two. The result, to any but an expert in Gospel criticism, is confusing in the last degree.

Professor Turner's study of St. Mark is delightful and inspiring reading throughout. In the realm of lower criticism, in the ascertainment of the original text, and in happy emendation of difficult passages, it marks a real advance; so also in the illumination of word-meanings by reference to current usage. As regards the "higher criticism," Professor Turner is adamant. He adheres strictly to the Petrine tradition: "It is not matter of serious debate," he says, "that the author was Mark the disciple of Peter"; and while he allows the "possibility of the intrusion of some slight amount of alien matter," in the main, and with the strongest emphasis, he insists that Mark is simply "a faithful interpreter" of another man's ideas, and that the Petrine story which he interprets "is a vivid and straightforward story of real experience."

This is robust statement, and is strongly supported by the evidence of Marcan linguistic usage summarized from the writer's own important articles in the *J.T.S.* On the positive side nothing is lacking; and no doubt Professor Turner is entitled to ignore the strong arguments for "development" or "re-writing" adduced (for example) by J. Weiss, Bacon, Rawlinson, and Klostermann. So firmly is any kind of "form-criticism"

excluded, that there is no reference to the theories of the composite character of Mark xiii. which are commonly held even among conservative critics. We are, indeed, told of liberal Protestants who "tend to deny the authentic character" of the eschatological tradition in the Gospel; but Professor Turner's reply is to assert—an assertion with which we are in full agreement—that it must have had "deep roots in our Lord's own teaching." From this statement, however, to the absolute authenticity of Mark xiii. is a long way; the first conclusion does not involve the second. But are we wrong in supposing that Professor Turner's silence on the second point implies an unhesitating acceptance of the whole of that difficult chapter as *ipsissima verba* of our Lord? If such a conclusion were not intended, would it not have been better to have stated the fact? And if it were intended, might not some reference to other theories of the chapter and its composition have been no less than warranted?

The change of atmosphere when we come to the First Gospel is extraordinary. Dr. Goudge and Professor Levertoff put forward an hypothesis of its composition which need not blush to be set alongside the most advanced German criticism. It is "form-criticism" of the most extreme. In brief, it assumes that the Gospel is dominated by the Deuteronomic Synagogue lections for the beginning of the Jewish year. It is not quite clear what form this "dominance" is supposed to take. Sometimes it appears as historical; the Baptist's call to repentance "finds a remarkably fitting place in preparation for New Year's Day"—from which we infer that the Baptist *chose* this time as especially appropriate for his message. Sometimes—though still historical—the connection is more literary; not an action, but a saying is influenced by the time of year (see, *e.g.*, on Matt. xii., 38-42). Sometimes, finally, the relationship is purely literary—the "mind of the evangelist" or "of the compiler of the Logia" is responsible for setting the Great Sermon where it stands, to get a Deuteronomic parallel; his purpose is to "relate the narratives in connection with the Deuteronomic lessons." But it would appear that this motive of arranging incidents to harmonize with lections must go back to Mark himself; for of the five incidents in Matt. viii. 23-ix. 26 which, as the editors suggest, Matthew "arranged" together on this basis, three are already to be found so "arranged" in the Marcan original, the other two being similarly "arranged" in an earlier section. The First Gospel, we must suppose, only perfected an elaborate literary or sub-literary process which had already affected the order of events in the Second.

The hypothesis just considered is primarily that of Mr.

Levertoff; but Dr. Goudge commends it to the notice of readers, and says nothing by way of reservation. As a hypothesis it is at once ingenious and illuminating; but its tentative and daring character leaps to the eye. In a commentary designed for general use, as distinct from a thesis intended for the eye of experts, so bold a supposition should scarcely have been made the main thread on which exegesis of the Gospel was strung; its proper place is in the introduction. But above all we feel surprised that the Editors should have set so "modern" a piece of interpretation alongside the commentary on St. Mark, with its emphatic rejection of the "modern" approach, and that without a word of warning.

In general, however, there is admirable material for readers of all kinds in the New Testament section. Dr. Gore's account of our Lord's life and teaching stands alone, perhaps, in the sphere of exposition; it can be commended without reserve. Dr. Goudge seems to us to modernize St. Paul overmuch; but Dr. Williams's Commentary on Romans redresses the balance—as the Regius Professor frankly acknowledges in his cross-references. Dr. Lowther Clarke's essay on the Gentile Background is sadly compressed, but within the limits allowed him he has achieved wonders; Dr. Oesterley on the Jewish Background is as illuminating as always. Professor Turner's essay on Textual Criticism makes even that difficult subject fascinating. The New Commentary will not, perhaps, supersede Peake (and its Editors have no wish that it should); but the two should stand side by side on every student's shelves. K. E. KIRK.

THE SECOND ISAIAH. A New Interpretation by Charles Cutler Torrey. T. and T. Clark. 15s.

This book has evidently appeared for chastisement as well as for instruction. The reader is told that the meaning of the Second Isaiah which the author expounds has been obscured from the middle of the third century B.C. to the present day. Commentators hitherto have been blind guides who have failed to delete all references to the Babylonian Exile, and to explain to their readers that the Deutero-Isaiah composed his work in Palestine in or about the year 400 B.C. Considerable courage is required of one who would thus supersede Sir George Adam Smith, Driver, Skinner, and Peake in this country, and Duhm, Marti, and Sellin in Germany—to mention but a few of those who have made valued contributions to the exegesis of the difficult critical problems which this book presents. But there it is: the best scholars of the present day present us with "an incomprehensible scrapheap"!

Professor Torrey is nothing if not thorough; and so there is now "no longer any possibility of maintaining a theory of composite authorship of . . . chapters xxxiv., xxxv., xl.-lxvi." Facts and relations become "certain," and "for the first time" the key to the interpretation of the Later Prophets is put into the reader's hands. But this is not all: the "bizarre fantasia" on which scholars have been content to work is now so transformed that it can throw new light on the Psalter, and on the whole nature of Hebrew poetry.

These are claims which, if they could be substantiated, would justify the statement on the "jacket" that "here is one of the outstanding books of our generation." How far does the author fulfil these promises? Since Duhm's famous commentary was written the theory of a Third Isaiah has gained ground. He argued that the situation in chapters lvi.-lxvi. could only be Palestinian, and must date from a time when the temple was rebuilt. Consequently it is held by many that chapters lvi.-lxvi. were (in part) written by a Third Isaiah, who closely imitated the language of his predecessor. This theory Professor Torrey dismisses as "intrinsically improbable," but it would have been only fair to cite other passages in the Old Testament which are incontestably imitations and adaptations of earlier poetry. In the interest of his theory that the whole work is homogeneous and dates from 400, he has to strike out the two specific references to Cyrus (later on Babylon and the Chaldeans have to go), and he commits himself to the statement that nothing else in the prophecy points to Babylonia as its provenance. But what, then, is the significance of the extraordinarily close parallels between the language of the Deutero-Isaiah and the Marduk liturgy, and the other equally striking similarities between the language of the Babylonian inscriptions and this writer?

Professor Torrey is most severe in his condemnation of the work of other scholars when he accuses them of want of appreciation of the form and content of the poetry of this book. But nothing could be more prosaic than his reasons for rejecting what is, after all, the argument of the poems as they stand. For our part we see no exaggeration in the prophet seeing in the advent of Cyrus both the deliverer of his people and the chastiser of the Gentiles. The author holds that it is very doubtful if the Deutero-Isaiah prophesied of Cyrus' astonishing military successes, and if he did, what then? The hopes he based on Cyrus were not fulfilled, and the Jews were soon disillusioned. Many will feel that not the least valuable lesson in this book is its faithful portrayal of the apparent defeat of Jehovah's purpose. He deigned to use men as his instruments, and none but the Suffering Servant was clean.

Cyrus is not the only figure to disappear from the pages of the Old Testament. The account of the Return of the Exiles under Cyrus must go. The command to flee from the Chaldeans really refers to the Flight from Egypt. The Second Isaiah knew of no recent restoration from Babylon: in fact, in his day the theory had not arisen. Furthermore, at the time of the Chronicler, despite 2 Ch. xxxvi. 22=Ezra i. 1-3, there was no mention of Cyrus in Isa. xlv. and xlv. Chronicles and Ezra-Nehemiah represent a perversion of history which was composed to gain general acceptance for the Jewish as against the Samaritan claim to be the trustees of Israel's religion.

Perhaps the most hazardous operation is performed upon the prophet's word "ravenous bird from the east" in xlv. 11 (which could not, of course, apply to any Israelite). Originally, we are told, "my servant" was written. It might just be credible that Cyrus' name had been interpolated into the text, if, and only if, some convincing reason could be suggested to account for such a strange act, but that a rare word like *'ayit*, which so exactly describes the head of a conquering horde, could have been improvised is in the highest degree improbable. But why need "my servant" have been altered at all? A man who did not mind transferring the titles "anointed" and Jehovah's "friend" from Abraham to the heathen Cyrus would hardly have boggled at "servant" when he found it in the text. And what is the reason for all these changes? "Someone saw in our poet's . . . songs . . . predictions of the Return from the Babylonian Exile, and wished to make them more definite. This was in every way most natural." It was. Nevertheless, the prophecies of a return are the "product of poetic imagination," and only when the Chronicler had invented the story of a return from Babylon was it possible to apply these prophecies thereto. We have more than a suspicion that this accumulation of hypothesis upon hypothesis is also the product of imagination.

Professor Torrey has contributed an interesting and suggestive chapter on the Messiah, and his remarks on the Massoretic system of vocalizing words in such a way as to suggest a variant reading, though not unrecognized by scholars as he supposes (the phenomenon known as *formæ mixtæ* is marked as ancient in good Hebrew grammars) are not without importance. xl. 10 is not an example as he would think. The author gives us a new translation with critical and exegetical notes. "He who is poor in substance" is a plausible emendation of the R.V. "He that is too impoverished for *such* an oblation" in xl. 20. Some curious renderings are: "From dominion and rule he was plucked down, and who could make account of his line?" and

"He will see of the fruit of his mortal travail, in knowing himself true will be satisfied."

If we have dwelt on the faults rather than on the merits of this book, it is because the service the author does in stressing the importance of the Jewish diaspora in the fifth century is impaired by his intemperate criticism of those he disagrees with. Indeed, the contemptuous phrases he uses of the work of others, coupled with a failure to recognize the complexity of the problems he attempts to solve, invite us to employ, with another application, the words he has provided on p. 35: "Like the sparks and stars which one sees when he receives a blow on the head, they are not really illuminating, and leave an unpleasant impression."

ALFRED GUILLAUME.

ETHICAL STUDIES. By F. H. Bradley. Second edition, with additional notes by the author. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 15s.

The republication of this famous volume of essays has long been ardently desired by lovers of philosophical literature, on more grounds than one. Historically they are important, as, apart from the difficult and often, by its mannerisms, irritating work of Hutchison Stirling, the earliest manifestation of the influence of Hegel which was to be so potent in the British philosophy of the generation which followed their first appearance in 1876. They are a masterpiece of brilliant and trenchant criticism of what had become the current orthodoxy of moral philosophy in our own country, the Utilitarianism of Mill, then at the height of its popularity. And, considered simply as literature, many pages of them are, as a writer in the *Times Literary Supplement* observed not long ago, among the finest examples of nineteenth-century English prose. The original issue of the book has long been out of print, copies have rarely come into the market, and always at an extremely high price, as the author steadily refused to reprint the work. At the end of his life, however, he had resolved to do for it what he did for his equally well known *Principles of Logic*, reissue it with additions and modifications. Preoccupation with the *Logic* and advanced age delayed the actual undertaking of the task until a time very shortly before his unexpected death in the late summer of 1924. Hence the new edition is, except for a few verbal changes, a reissue of the old with a number of footnotes made by Bradley himself as *memoranda* for the additional material he did not live to complete. So far as can be seen from these brief and often tantalizing jottings, Bradley, had he

lived to revise his book, would have made no considerable modifications in his main position. He would clearly have withdrawn some of the more extreme polemical points made to the criticism of Mill's Hedonism, and have admitted that, on the whole, where the circumstances are not exceptional, the morally better life is also the more pleasurable, a position explicitly affirmed by a philosopher so little inclined to Hedonism as Plato (in the fifth book of the *Laws*). It seems probable also that he would have undertaken the very desirable task of making a careful examination of the exact meaning of "selfishness," one of the most loosely used terms of the whole of our ethical vocabulary. To judge from certain indications, he would most likely have taken the interesting position that the selfishness which is morally wrong is neither regard for one's own well-being nor necessarily the preference of the "lower" self and its gratifications to the "higher," but "undue disregard for the reasonable and justifiable claims of other selves," a view which seems to me clearly right, but is incompatible with the suggestion of several passages in the text of the *Essays*, that there is necessarily something selfish about the theory of pleasure as the good. In view of the peculiarly eloquent exposition of the doctrine of "justification by faith," as the essence of all true religion, with which *Ethical Studies* concludes, it is interesting to observe that on second thoughts the statement that Protestantism has made "justification by faith alone" its own "to its eternal glory" is qualified by the addition that Protestantism has also perverted the conception "to its eternal disgrace," and that a sentence in which the English language was congratulated for containing no equivalent to the expression *un religieux* is retracted as "due to ignorance" with the comment that the most secluded "religious life" is indirectly practical "if through the unity of the spiritual body it can be taken as vicarious." Some of us will also be glad to gather that the author of the famous essay on *My Station and its Duties* was alive to the possibility that some of its expressions might be understood as virtually identifying "the state" with the "body of Christ," and intended to disavow the suggestion. It is clear that if Bradley had carried through the revision he had in mind, the purely provisional character of the identification of morality with the discharge of the "duties of my station" would have been much more strongly insisted on, with the result that the "conscience of the individual" would have come very much more by its rights. The one unintentional injustice which apparently would not have been put right is that done to the memory of Kant in the vigorous onslaught of the fourth essay on "categorical imperatives," if the criticism

is really meant to hit Kant himself, as is most probable. Like most of the Hegelian critics, Bradley never seems to have realized that Kant never, for example, undertook to show that it is "always immoral to doom one's self to certain death," or even actually to kill one's self. What he did maintain is that it is always immoral to take one's own life to escape suffering. This leaves it an open question whether there may not be motives of a different order which might make it a moral duty to end one's life (as perhaps there may have been in the case of the Italian insurgent mentioned on p. 158). Kant himself, it should be remembered, proposes it as a casuistic question whether a patient in the early stages of hydrophobia would not do right to kill himself in order to avoid communicating the malady, and, again, whether the moral law forbade Frederic II. to carry poison as a safeguard against being captured and forced to redeem himself by stipulations incompatible with the welfare of his kingdom. Even if we suppose that Kant held that both questions should be answered in the sense unfavourable to suicide, as I presume he did in the second case, the fact that he asks them is proof that he did not simply identify the categorical imperatives of morality with our current working maxims.

In some respects *Ethical Studies* may be regarded as having done its work. Living students today are no longer likely to feel a deep personal interest in the polemic against Mill or Bain, and may possibly be quicker than some of us were, thirty years and more ago, to resent some of the strokes of the writer's wit as not quite fair. But the reason is that the substance of the criticism has long since got home, and its fundamental justice is acknowledged. Hedonism, in anything like the form in which it was giving itself out as the only rational theory of conduct in 1876, is dead, and it owes its death very largely to the blows dealt it in *Ethical Studies*. We can afford to ask today dispassionately whether it might not be restated in a way which would escape the shafts of the satirist, just because there is now no danger that our best young people will spoil their lives under the influence of a Hedonistic theory. Yet, whatever the exaggerations afterwards recognized as such by the author, Bradley's onslaught will still not merely retain its historical interest, but deserve study for its wisdom as well as its wit. And I think it may be said that the final essay on the relations between morality and religion, and the first on the "scientific determinism" which undermines belief in the reality of moral responsibility, are never likely to be out of date.

A. E. TAYLOR.

NOTICES

PRE-EXISTENCE AND REINCARNATION. By W. Lutoslawski. Allen and Unwin. 6s.

This small book is the work of a Polish professor of philosophy, who brings together arguments for beliefs indicated in the title. The author claims that these beliefs, in the form in which he advocates them, have never been condemned by the Church, whereas a number of eminent names from different ages can be cited to support them. Much of his material is derived from Polish "Messianism," a form of politico-religious thought which will be unfamiliar to most English readers. The author dissociates himself from spiritism and from popular theosophical movements and seeks to base his argument upon genuine philosophical inquiry. Much of what he has to say about human life is true and beautiful, and his book has a high spiritual and social tone. But on the subject of which he writes he claims to possess "infallible knowledge, implying absolute certainty." With such convictions the writer finds convincing proofs of palingenesis where others will find no such thing. His conception of "a perfectly scientific proof" (p. 62) and some of the evidence which he brings forward seem scarcely to deserve serious discussion.

L. S. THORNTON, C.R.

THE GODDESS OF MERCY. By J. L. Stewart. Sheldon Press. 7s. 6d.

A host of sane, well-written books, crammed with reliable facts and offering many suggestions for reaching the rather resentful and sensitive heart of the East, have been issued during the past quarter of a century. These challenging, informative books have gripped many of the keen, high-spirited younger generation, and made the modern missionary movement a big thing in our religious life.

But it is still a Minority Movement. The easily ascertainable facts and the challenge of a changing world are still beyond the knowledge of the many. For to the majority of people facts, just facts, are dry and uninteresting. To grip the average mind facts must be clothed with flesh and blood and made to live.

For that reason the coming of the missionary novel was an inevitable and a necessary thing. It is the ideal medium for making the dry bones of stark facts live, to challenge, allure, or appeal. *The Goddess of Mercy* is an ideal example and proof. Few save those who have lived for many years in close touch with the people of China have any real conception of what is being so slowly worked out before the astonished gaze of the world. Strange names, irritatingly alike and difficult to pronounce, complicate what is in any case a literal Chinese puzzle. Years of scare-mongering concerning the Yellow Peril, and a score of widely-read novels in which the Chinese are presented in a light which makes them appear as very clever devils, have raised a very formidable barrier of ignorance.

In *The Goddess of Mercy* one is made to feel the Chinese as real human beings, with the same variations of good and evil in individuals as exist among ourselves. Customs which seem cruel to Western eyes, and which have gained the Chinese an unenviable reputation, are presented through

Chinese eyes and assume a different complexion. The author has used the tangled skein of two young Chinese lives to impart a wealth of invaluable information concerning the people as they really are, rather than as they exist to the hectic imagination of sensational novelists, and also to trace the real origins and the inward developments of the Revolutionary Movement still being worked out. The Christian missionary with her gracious influence runs through the story but is never obtruded. It is a gripping, informative novel of China and Chinese life, written by one with an intimate knowledge of the people. Facts are there in abundance, but they are living facts because they come to us in a swiftly-moving drama of love and hate, ignorance that is abominably cruel, and love which uplifts because it is strong and pure. It is unquestionably a book which to many will come as a key to the Chinese Puzzle.

ARTHUR E. SOUTHON.

CHRISTIAN GUIDANCE OF THE SOCIAL INSTINCTS: A SURVEY OF THE CHURCH'S WORK FOR SOCIAL PURITY. J. M. Cole, M.A., and F. C. Bacon. Faith Press. 4s.

The object of this book is "to indicate the need and purpose of moral welfare work, and to show how far the present organizations . . . meet the need." The object is fully attained so far as the size of the volume allows, and a full and admirable bibliography would give scope for years of further study. As a handbook it will be indispensable to all who are beginning the study of the Christian reaction to the social problem.

The book begins with a brief historical outline which goes back to pre-Christian times and points out that until recent years impurity was for the most part in practice, and sometimes even in theory, treated as a necessary evil. The change of outlook is associated with the great names of Josephine Butler, Ellice Hopkins, and Mrs. Ruspini. Nowadays on all sides it would be acknowledged that the only ultimate aim of all work for social purity is to eliminate the causes which produce the sad victims of immorality. It is not enough to talk about original sin: we must also consider housing, diet, and the defects of our industrial and educational systems.

The main portion of the book is occupied with a series of sketches of the work in all its branches, and it concludes with two fuller chapters on the training and equipment of the worker.

Two quotations may be given, not as in any way original, but as illustrating the scope of the book. "'The Unmarried Mother' is a short and conventional title which really expresses only one-third of the problem, whose other factors are the illegitimate child and the unmarried father. . . . It is not adequate help to offer the mother good advice, the child an institution, and the father a shrug of the shoulders" (p. 105). "There is a danger of assuming that the social problem has its existence solely in the lower strata of our society, that it is simply a problem of poverty, a problem of the slum, a problem of the submerged tenth" (quoted from Professor Urwick on p. 167).

A misuse of the technical term "theological virtues" on p. 70 might be corrected in a later edition.

K. D. MACKENZIE.

FROM MOWBRAYS' LIST

THE SOWER. A Study of the Parable of Parables. By the Rev. CHARLES C. BELL, M.A., Precentor of York and Canon-Residentiary, Author of "The Work of an Evangelist." Cloth, 4s. 6d. (Post 4½d.)

CONTENTS: The Mystery of the Kingdom; The Divine Sower; The Authority of the Sower; The Seed; The Soil; The Hard Soil; The Shallow Soil; The Soil Beset with Thorns; The Fruitful Soil.

THE FAITH OF THE CHURCH. An Explanation of Christian Theology for English Catholics. By the Rev. KENNETH D. MACKENZIE, M.A., formerly Fellow and Dean of Pembroke College, Oxford, Author of "The Way of the Church." Cloth, 5s. (Post 5d.)

CONTENTS: God; God Revealed; Salvation; God Within; The Church; The Sacramental Principle; The Holy Eucharist; Penance; Grace; The Life of the World to Come; Prayer.

THE LORD OF LOVE. Thirty Meditations on the Life of Our Lord. By the Rev. KARL TIEDEMANN, M.A. Cloth, 4s. 6d. (Post 4½d.)

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

THE GLORIES OF JESUS. With a Preface by the Rev. P. N. WAGGETT, D.D., S.S.J.E. Cloth, 4s. 6d. (Post 4½d.)

"Let us take this book with us when we go into the Presence for our daily meditation during Lent."

Church Times.
"Whenever I have opened it and tried to use it according to the author's devout intention, I have been truly helped. . . ."—From Fr. Waggett's Preface.

MIRRORS OF THE HOLY. Ten Studies in Sanctity. By LUCY MENZIES, Author of "St. Columba of Iona," "Saints in Italy," etc. With Frontispiece and Four other Plates in Photogravure. 12s. 6d. (Post 6d.)

"A valuable and useful book; a book which it would be good to read at retreats; a book which shows how very close the human soul can come to God and the radiant effect which such a conjunction has on the lives around. . . . A book which is touching and helpful to read."

The DEAN OF WINCHESTER in the Church of England Newspaper.

"Miss Menzies, whose beautiful studies of ten women saints are intended to 'show in a simple way what sanctity really is,' has chosen the only method promising success; that of exhibition, not disquisition. Combining real historical knowledge with great temperamental sympathy, she is able to reveal the saints to us as human beings; in their heroic acts, their profound sayings, and their lovable simplicity."

MISS EVELYN UNDERHILL in the Spectator.

AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH. A Study of Principles. By the Rev. T. A. LACEY, D.D., Canon of Worcester. Cloth, 3s. 6d. (Post 3d.)

"Dealing with a matter of special interest to-day, Dr. Lacey's work will be all the more welcome because its learning is expressed in simple terms and its arguments are stated with admirable lucidity."

The Times Literary Supplement.

"A little book the importance of which is out of all proportion to its size."—*Guardian.*

THE GOSPEL AND MODERNISM. By the Rev. A. E. BAKER, Author of "How to Understand Philosophy," etc. With an Introduction by the Very Rev. THE DEAN OF YORK. Paper, 2s. 6d. (Post 2d.) Cloth, 3s. 6d. (Post 3d.)

"A book of quite exceptional merit. . . . A really solid contribution to contemporary thought, based, as the Dean of York says in his Preface, on careful study and independent thinking."—*Church Times.*

"We can conscientiously commend this able and invigorating little volume."—*Guardian.*

SERMON OUTLINES. By the Rev. MARCUS DONOVAN, Vicar of St. Agnes', Kennington Park. 5s. (Post 5d.)

Contains one hundred and fifteen sermons for the Sundays and principal Holy Days of the Christian Year. The index is so arranged that the preacher can turn immediately to the subject he wishes to deal with.

"We give a very high place to this volume of outline sermons, every one of which leaves a lesson imprinted on the mind. Moreover, they are thoroughly Biblical, and nothing gives such freshness and clarity to the sermon as a wise and loving use of Holy Scripture."—*Church Times.*

A HANDBOOK OF CHURCH LAW FOR THE CLERGY. By E. J. C. NEEP, Barrister-at-Law, and GEORGE EDINGER, B.A., Barrister-at-Law. Cloth, 3s. 6d. (Post 3d.)

"Clergymen who wish to find quickly and easily the solution of the many points of law and practice which are continually arising in a parish, will find this book a very satisfactory help. But the interest of the book need not be confined to the clergy. . . ."—*The Times Literary Supplement.*

AFTER THIS MANNER. A Study of the Lord's Prayer in the Light of the Lord's Prayers. By GERTRUDE HOLLIS. 2s. (Post 1½d.)

"All thoughtful Christians know how very difficult it is to say the Lord's Prayer with true devotion. May this little book help us to learn from our Lord's own Prayers how to say it, how to pray it, how to live it 'after this manner'."—*Author's Preface.*

A. R. MOWBRAY & CO., LTD., 28, Margaret Street,
Oxford Circus, London, W. 1; and 9, High Street, Oxford

MR. MURRAY'S BOOKS FOR LENT READING

By the Rt. Rev. A. C. HEADLAM, C.H., D.D.

(Bishop of Gloucester)

THE BUILDING OF THE CHURCH OF CHRIST

"It is many years since there has appeared a volume of sermons so clearly written, so massively learned, and so full of teaching."—*Record*. 7s. 6d. net.

ESUS CHRIST IN HISTORY AND FAITH

"Only a scholar could have written a book like this. It is brief, clear in outline, plain to the general reader; yet everywhere there are evident the immense reserves of the student."—*Sunday Times*. Second Edition. 6s. net.

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

"Dr. Headlam has given us a book which should take its place as a classic on the subject."—*The Guardian*. Second Impression. 12s. net.

THE LIFE AND TEACHING OF JESUS THE CHRIST

"Judged as a contribution to New Testament scholarship, written in the terms which modern criticism demands, this is a brilliant and fascinating book."—*Church Times*. Fifth Impression. 12s. net.

By the Rt. Rev. CHARLES GORE, D.D.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF BELIEF

Belief in God. Belief in Christ. The Holy Spirit and the Church.

"Notwithstanding all criticism it remains that Dr. Gore is unquestionably the leading figure in the Church of England to-day."—*The Church Times*.

New Edition in One Volume.

1024 pp. 7s. 6d. net.

CAN WE THEN BELIEVE ?

"There must be hundreds of honest but puzzled men and women who will be very grateful for this book."—*Guardian*. 6s. net.

THE ANGLICAN COMMUNION

Edited by the REV. CANON H. A. WILSON. "Of permanent value. The selection of speakers could hardly have been improved upon; the brain of the Church of England has been fully utilized."—*Church of England Newspaper*. 7s. 6d. net.

TRUE RELIGION

By the late VERY REV. DEAN PAGE-ROBERTS. This volume contains thirteen of the sermons preached by Dr. Page-Roberts, and embodies some of the essentials of his teachings during the twenty-nine years of his ministry at St. Peter's, Vere Street. 3s. 6d. net.

A CHAIN OF PRAYER ACROSS THE AGES

By SELINA F. FOX. 2000 B.C.—A.D. 1920. "Gives many prayers of beauty which are not commonly accessible."—*Church Times*. Pocket size on Thin Paper. Fifth Edition. 5s. net.

THE PSALMS IN HUMAN LIFE

By the RT. HON. ROWLAND E. PROTHERO (LORD ERNLE). "It is in reality the 'Romance of the Psalms,' and abounds in pure and lofty thought."—*Daily Telegraph*. Pocket Ed. on Thin Paper. Cl., 3s. 6d. net. Lthr., 5s. net.

THE HUMAN PARSON

By the REV. H. R. L. ("Dick") SHEPPARD. "Invaluable in its positive advice, warnings and stimulating power."—*Modern Churchman*. Seventh Impression. 2s. 6d. net.

JOHN MURRAY, Albemarle Street, LONDON, W.1

RECENT BOOKS

LEVITATION: An Examination of the Evidence and Explanations

By OLIVIER LEROY, Professeur agrégé de l'Université. Demy 8vo., cloth. 10s. 6d.

INDULGENCES: Their Origin, Nature and Development

By H.E. CARDINAL ALEXIS LÉPICIER, O.S.M. Third English Edition, revised and enlarged. Crown 8vo., cloth. 10s. 6d.

A CHESTERTON CATHOLIC ANTHOLOGY

Compiled and edited by PATRICK BRAYBROOKE, F.R.S.L. With a Foreword by Father OWEN DUDLEY, and a Portrait. Demy 8vo., cloth. 6s.

NEWMAN ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FAITH IN THE INDIVIDUAL

By SYLVESTER P. JUERGENS, S.M., S.T.D. Crown 8vo., cloth. 7s. 6d.

THE MINOR WORKS OF WALTER HILTON

Edited by DOROTHY JONES. Being No. 17 of "The Orchard Books." Cloth, 5s.; leather, 7s. 6d.

LITTLE LIVES OF GREAT TERTIARIES

By MARIAN NESBITT. Crown 8vo., paper boards. 2s. 6d.

OF THE JOY OF LOVING GOD: According to the Spirit of Saint Thérèse of the Child Jesus

By PÈRE MORTIER, O.P. Translated from the French by the Dominican Sisters of Portobello Road. Foolscap 8vo., cloth. 2s. 6d.

SERMONS ON SAINT THÉRÈSÈE OF THE CHILD JESUS

By Father FRANCIS XAVIER of St Teresa, O.D.C. Translated from the Italian by a Religious of the Society of the Holy Child, Crown 8vo., cloth. 3s.

A JUNIOR BIBLE HISTORY

By the Rev. CHARLES HART, B.A. With 28 illustrations. Crown 8vo., cloth limp. 2s. 6d.

SOME PATHFINDERS OF ORGANIC EVOLUTION

By the Rev. PHILIP DE TERNANT. Crown 8vo., wrapper. 1s.

LIFE OF PÈRE ÉTIENNE PERNET, Founder of the Congregation of the Little Sisters of the Assumption (1824-1899)

Taken from the French by ALICE, LADY LOVAT. With a Preface and 13 illustrations. Crown 8vo., cloth. 6d.

NOTES OF RETREATS

Given by Father BERNARD VAUGHAN, S.J., and recorded from the Notes of CAROLINE, LADY PAGET. With a Preface by H.E. CARDINAL BOURNE, and a Portrait. Crown 8vo., cloth. 6s.

BURNS OATES AND WASHBOURNE (1929) LTD.

PUBLISHERS TO THE HOLY SEE

28 Orchard Street, W. 1

129 Victoria Street, S.W. 1

LONDON

8-10 Paternoster Row, E.C. 4

33 Ashley Place, S.W. 1

And at Manchester, Birmingham, and Glasgow.

ENGLISH CHURCH UNION

THE ENGLISH CHURCH UNION still maintains the unique position which it has occupied for seventy years in the Catholic Movement.

It devotes its enormous resources to the steadfast defence of Catholic Doctrine and Discipline, and persists in upholding the claim of the Church of England to be an integral part of the whole Catholic Church of Christ.

It has devoted itself, through its Literature Committee, to the production of literature in all branches of Theology and Ethics, including the admirable One Volume Catholic Commentary on the whole Bible (S.P.C.K. 16s.) and the Second Edition of "The Catechism of Catholic Faith and Practice" (S.P.C.K., 2d.).

The Union, through its Legal Committee and by means of its great financial resources, is able to afford counsel, protection and assistance to all persons, lay or clerical, who may be oppressed in any spiritual matter.

In all its activities the Union seeks to co-operate with all other Catholic Societies, and looks forward hopefully to the day when all such Societies may be united and work together under one leadership for the support of Catholic Principles and Practice.

Conditions of Membership : Membership is open to all members of the Church of England and of Churches in Communion with her who are communicants, and the membership is graduated as follows : Full Members, 10/- a year ; Associates, 2/6 ; and Adherents, 1/-.

The Church Union Gazette is published monthly at the incredibly low price of 1/6 per annum, post free.

ARNOLD PINCHARD,

Secretary.

31, Russell Square, W.C. 1.